Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 39

Issue 3

Article 1

4-15-2012

Experience-Based Opinion Testimony: Strengthening the Lay
Opinion Rule
Anne Bowen Poulin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Anne Bowen Poulin Experience-Based Opinion Testimony: Strengthening the Lay Opinion Rule , 39 Pepp.
L. Rev. Iss. 3 (2012)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol39/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

DO NOT DELETE

3/14/2012 2:30 PM

Experience-Based Opinion
Testimony: Strengthening the
Lay Opinion Rule
Anne Bowen Poulin*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. OPINION TESTIMONY UNDER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. Lay Opinion—Rule 701
1. Based on the Perception of the Witness
2. Rationally Based on the Witness’s Perception
3. Helpful
4. Not Based on Scientific, Technical, or Other
Specialized Knowledge
B. Expert Testimony—Rule 702
C. Delineating the Difference
III. THE LINE BETWEEN LAY AND EXPERT OPINION: WHY DOES IT
MATTER?
A. Evaluation of the Opinion
B. Basis of the Opinion
C. Disclosure of the Basis to the Court and Jury
1. Disclosure to the Court
2. Disclosure to the Jury
D. Form of Testimony: The Hypothetical Question
E. Pretrial Disclosure Requirements
F. Deference Accorded Expert Opinion
IV. THE ROLE OF EXPERIENCE IN ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR
OPINION TESTIMONY
A. How Experience Informs Lay Opinion: Similar Happenings
and Other Act Evidence
1. Similar Happenings and Lay Opinion

* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I am indebted to Keri Engelman,
Jacqueline Gorbey, Kristin Mancuso, and Angela Hennesy for their excellent research assistance, to
my colleague Professor Louis Sirico for his helpful comments, and to Villanova University School
of Law for its generous support.

551

DO NOT DELETE

3/14/2012 2:30 PM
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B. How Experience Informs Expert Opinion
V. THE RISK OF ADMITTING OPINION BASED ON EXPERIENCE ALONE
VI. SCRUTINIZING EXPERIENCE-BASED OPINION: APPLYING RULE 701
WITH BITE
A. Evaluate Experience-Based Opinion as Lay Opinion
B. Be Skeptical of Claimed Expertise Based on Shared
Experience
C. Evaluate the Fit Between the Witness’s Experience and the
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E. Prohibit Over-Claiming
VII. CONCLUSION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the familiar expert witness scene from the movie My Cousin
Vinny. Vinny, played by Joe Pesci, calls as a witness Mona Lisa Vito,
played by Marisa Tomei. Her experience as an auto mechanic is held to
qualify her as an expert in general automotive knowledge. The court allows
her to testify that the set of tire tracks made by the fleeing felons’ car could
not have been made by the defendant’s car because only a car with
positraction could have left those tracks. Her testimony leads to the
dismissal of all charges. But is she an expert? Should she be given the
latitude accorded an expert to base her testimony on information not
personally known to her and to express an opinion without clarifying its
basis for the jury? Or is she a lay witness with an unusual experience base
and therefore limited to conclusions rationally derived from her base of
knowledge?
Take an example of typical testimony offered as expert opinion in a
prosecution for a narcotics violation. The defendant is charged with illegal
distribution of cocaine, but claims he is not a drug dealer. At trial, the
prosecution calls a law enforcement agent to testify that certain aspects of
the defendant’s conduct were consistent with the behavior of an experienced
drug dealer. Specifically, the agent opines that when the defendant circled
the parking lot before meeting with the undercover agents, he was engaging
in counter-surveillance, that the defendant’s use of a rental car is the mark of
an experienced drug dealer, and that, when the defendant spoke with the
informant to set up the sale, he used the coded language of a drug dealer.
The law enforcement witness bases these opinions on experience
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investigating drug cases. Is the opinion testimony admissible? Should the
court evaluate the evidence as expert or as lay opinion?1
Consider experience-based testimony offered on the question of design
defect. The plaintiff lost his leg when he was hit by a car while riding a
motorcycle. He claims that the motorcycle was defectively designed
because it did not have crash bars. Experts dispute the efficacy of the crash
bars used on police motorcycles. To support his claim, the plaintiff calls a
former police chief who has served on motorcycle patrol and has
investigated motorcycle accidents. The witness’s opinion is that police
motorcycle crash bars are effective. The witness has no scientific or
engineering expertise in motorcycle design and limited experience with the
type of motorcycle the plaintiff was riding at the time of the accident.
Should the court evaluate the offered testimony as expert opinion or as lay
opinion? Is it admissible?2
Finding the line between expert and lay opinion testimony is not always
easy.3 Determining where experience-based opinion falls on this spectrum
has proven particularly challenging to the courts. Opinion based on the
witness’s unusual experience base does not always fit neatly into either
category. In some cases, the court undervalues relevant experience as a
basis for opinion, either lay or expert. In others, the court defers too readily
to the claim that a witness’s experience qualifies the witness to provide an
opinion, often treating experience as sufficient to establish expertise.

1. This hypothetical is based on United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir.
1997) (discussed infra note 179 and accompanying text). In Figueroa-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the testimony should have been evaluated as expert opinion and excluded because the
prosecution did not provide the required pretrial notice. Id. at 1246.
2. This hypothetical is based on Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 52 F.3d 1311, 1316–18 (5th Cir.
1995) (discussed infra at notes 183–190 and accompanying text). The facts of that case are detailed
in the district court opinion, Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 758 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. Miss. 1991), rev’d,
984 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1993). In Satcher, the Fifth Circuit held that the testimony was admissible
expert opinion. Satcher, 52 F.3d at 1317–18.
3. See United States v. Colón Osorio, 360 F.3d 48, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2004); Downeast Ventures,
Ltd. v. Wash. Cnty., 450 F. Supp. 2d 106, 110–11 (D. Me. 2006); Falconer v. Penn Mar., Inc., 421 F.
Supp. 2d 190, 208 (D. Me. 2006) (noting that the line between lay and expert testimony is not
always easy to draw); State v. Ellis, 547 S.E.2d 490, 493 (S.C. 2001) (dissent disagreeing with
majority conclusion that officer’s testimony went beyond his expertise and arguing it was
permissible lay opinion); 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 11, at 59 (6th
ed. 2006) (recognizing difficulty); Brandon L. Bigelow, Summary and Expert Witnesses: A
Distinction with a Difference, 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 1 (2004) (discussing confusion
that can arise at trial); Daniel J. Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses and Experts, N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 13, 1998, at 3 [hereinafter Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses] (discussing
difficulty of delineating the line under pre-amendment rules); David Martinez & Bree Arlyn-Pessin,
Undesignated Hitters, L.A. LAW., Feb. 26, 2004, at 28 (referring to the “often blurry distinction”).
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The Federal Rules of Evidence (the Rules) were amended in 2000,
adopting specific, more stringent requirements for expert testimony and
hardening the line between lay and expert opinion. Expert opinion
testimony is now admissible only if based on reliable methodology, whereas
lay opinion must merely be rationally derived using everyday reasoning.4
The decisions applying these rules do not strike the right balance with regard
to experience-based opinion. Too often, courts allow opinion testimony
simply because the witness has an unusual base of experience, either
accepting a claim of experience-based expertise at face value or admitting
experience-based opinion as lay opinion without rigorously applying the
governing rule. As a result, the courts admit unreliable and unwarranted
opinion testimony and grant unqualified witnesses latitude in presenting
opinion accorded only to experts. This Article explains why more
experience-based opinion should be evaluated as lay opinion, and also
argues for increased scrutiny of such lay opinion.
The improper admission of experience-based opinion is particularly
problematic in criminal cases. Law enforcement officers are routinely
permitted to testify as experts based on their law enforcement experience.5

4. FED. R. EVID. 701–02.
5. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (permitting law enforcement officer with
specialization in obscenity cases to provide expert testimony regarding the state’s community
standards and whether defendant was in violation of them); United States v. Vann, 336 F. App’x 944
(11th Cir. 2009) (permitting police detective to testify as expert witness regarding drug use and
practice); United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1989) (using a police officer to provide
expert testimony as to whether substance in question was cocaine); United States v. Brown, 872 F.2d
385, 392 (11th Cir. 1989) (allowing FBI special agent to provide expert testimony regarding “drug
code” interpretation and jargon); Williams v. Evans, No. CV F 08-01586 LJO BAK HC, 2009 WL
1460832, at *31–32 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (referencing long history of allowing law enforcement
officers to testify as experts on gangs and gang activity); 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 13, at 70
n.16 (stating that expert witness knowledge may be derived from experience, and listing law
enforcement testimony regarding the modus operandi for various crimes as exemplary of such
experience-based knowledge); 3 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702:2,
at 74 n.4 (6th ed. 2006) (stating that courts commonly recognize expert testimony of law
enforcement officers). A number of commentators have criticized the use of law enforcement
officers as prosecution experts in criminal cases. See, e.g., Phylis Skloot Bamberger, The Dangerous
Expert Witness, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 855 (1986); Joelle Anne Moreno, What Happens When Dirty
Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2004) (criticizing
courts for allowing prosecution experts to testify without scrutinizing their basis); D. Michael
Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000) (discussing disparity between standards applied to prosecution
experts and those applied to defense experts). The courts’ ready acceptance of questionable law
enforcement expert testimony may be precipitated in part by the courts’ frequent exposure to law
enforcement testimony in hearings on defense motions to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment
grounds. In such a hearing, evidence is relevant that should not ordinarily be admitted at trial. For
example, evidence concerning the law enforcement officer’s state of mind and understanding based
on prior cases, as well as the defendant’s reputation for drug trafficking can be introduced to support
the prosecution’s claim that the officer had probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Similarly, an
officer can rely on information obtained from other officers when determining whether there is
probable cause. See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing the
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The prosecution employs these opinion witnesses to ascribe criminal
significance to otherwise innocent conduct. The prosecution also uses them
to advance and endorse inferences supporting guilt that the prosecution will
argue to the jury at the end of the trial. Most of this law enforcement
testimony should not be admitted as either expert or lay opinion. The courts
should curtail this practice by enforcing the rules governing opinion
testimony, with less deference given to the prosecution’s claims.6
Courts should assess all experience-based opinion with greater care.
When a party offers as an expert a witness who has an unusual experience
base, the court should scrutinize the way in which the expert arrived at the
offered inferences. If a witness has a broad base of relevant experience, but
brings no methodology to bear in drawing inferences, the witness’s opinion
should be treated as lay opinion. A witness who is merely applying
everyday reasoning to draw inferences from the combination of the
witness’s experience and the relevant observed facts should not be granted
the latitude accorded an expert. Taking this approach, courts would not
allow a witness to give expert opinion based solely on experience without
determining that the witness had a reliable and specialized mode of analysis,
and had applied it to a reliable basis. Most experience-based opinion would
be evaluated as lay opinion and restricted accordingly.
In addition, the rule governing lay opinion, Rule 701, should be given
more bite. The courts should scrutinize lay opinion to make sure that the
witness’s knowledge supports the inferences reflected in the opinion. Lay
opinion must be rationally related to the witness’s perception. Under the

difference between information pertinent for probable cause and foundation necessary for admissible
lay opinion). Such testimony may also be admissible to explain the reasonableness of an officer’s
actions in civil cases where a law enforcement officer is sued for damages by someone who was the
object of police action. See, e.g., Lawson v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 1998) (action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 where key question was whether officer had probable cause). None of these
avenues should be open to the prosecution at trial. While strongly probative on Fourth Amendment
questions, the evidence is both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial at trial.
6. The problem with the prosecution’s use of experts relates closely to the flaws in the forensic
sciences discussed in the National Academy of Sciences Report. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD
(2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE]. Law enforcement experts claim
experience and pooled information from within the law enforcement community as a basis for
expertise. But the prosecution does not demonstrate the reliability of the expert opinion for the
particular case and the particular questions addressed by the claimed expert. See also Paul C.
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Reliability of Scientific
Proof, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1988) (discussing unreliability and role of subjective judgment in
forensic analysis); Moreno, supra note 5, at 34–35 (discussing law enforcement testimony regarding
drug jargon interpretation and noting that “there has [never] been a real effort to study or test the
reliability of any drug jargon definitions”).
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rule, the trial court should demand that the opinion reflect inferences that can
fairly be drawn from the facts observed by the witness using everyday
reasoning. Currently, courts permit witnesses to express opinions simply
because they possess unusual experience, without any assurance that their
opinions satisfy these requirements. As a result, they allow the jury to hear
unreliable opinion testimony.
This Article explains why more of the testimony given by experienced
witnesses who inhabit the border between lay and expert status should be
evaluated under the rules governing lay opinion and suggests specific
guidelines for scrutinizing opinion testimony. Section II outlines the law
governing lay and expert opinion and the differentiation between the two
types of opinion. Section III explains why it makes a difference whether an
opinion is evaluated as lay rather than expert. Section IV examines the
relationship between experience and opinion testimony, looking at the ways
in which the witness’s experience may inform the opinion. Section V
highlights the risks entailed in admitting opinion testimony based solely on
experience. Finally, Section VI suggests five guidelines for a court
determining the admissibility of experience-based opinion: (1) the court
should generally determine the admissibility of the opinion under the rules
governing lay opinion; (2) the court should be skeptical of claims that the
witness possesses expertise based on experience and “training,”
understanding that the combination of experience and training does not
necessarily signal that the witness brings reliable methodology to bear on the
facts; (3) the court should scrutinize the fit between the witness’s experience
and the proffered opinion; (4) the court should strictly limit opinion
testimony that draws inferences based on third party conduct; and (5) the
court should preclude witnesses from over-generalizing based on their
experience.
II. OPINION TESTIMONY UNDER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
The Federal Rules of Evidence devote an entire article to opinion
testimony. For purposes of this discussion, two rules are critical. Rule 701
defines the requirements for lay opinion testimony.7 Rule 702 sets the
parameters for admitting expert testimony.8 Both rules were amended in
2000 to demark the line between them more clearly and to assure the
reliability of opinion evidence.9

7. See infra Section II.A.
8. See infra Section II.B.
9. See generally STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 92–95 (discussing 2000
amendment).

556

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 551, 2012]

3/14/2012 2:30 PM

Experience-Based Opinion Testimony
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

The common law rules that predated the Federal Rules of Evidence
restricted the use of both lay and expert opinion.10 When the Federal Rules
of Evidence were enacted in 1975, they relaxed the restrictions on opinion
testimony.11 For example, whereas the common law typically restricted the
use of opinion testimony to instances in which the jury could not otherwise
understand the evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted a lower
threshold for admitting opinion.12 Under the rules, opinion evidence can be

10. See 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1401, at 591–
605 (4th ed. 2005) (stating the common law opinion rule and discussing its criticisms); 7 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1919–22, at 14–29 (1978) (criticizing
the opinion rule and advocating for its abandonment).
11. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (commenting that lay opinion should not
be subjected to the requirement that it be necessary and that “the practical impossibility of
determining by rule what is a ‘fact’” has created problems in the law of evidence); FED. R. EVID. 702
advisory committee’s note (noting that the key to admissibility is simply whether the testimony will
assist the trier of fact); see also Bamberger, supra note 5 (discussing liberalization of rules governing
expert testimony). Wigmore criticized the common law rules limiting the admissibility of opinion
evidence and argued that opinion should be admitted more readily. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 10, §§
1919–22, at 14–29; see also Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1195 (3d
Cir. 1995) (discussing Wigmore and other critics); 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 55
(discussing Wigmore’s position and suggesting that a number of judges already take the Wigmore
approach). In 1901, Learned Hand explained the rationale for and development of the rules limiting
opinion evidence:
The rule that a witness shall not testify to mere opinion or conclusion is such a rule, and
its origin no doubt was, if we could trace it, due to a gradual recognition by successive
judges of the advantage of curtailing the trial and simplifying the issue by leaving out
redundant matter. I call this redundant because in fact the opinion of the witness upon
the issue can have no useful bearing on the case, and trenches on the jury’s function. It is
the jury that should form the opinion, make the conclusion and say truly—vere dicere—
the fact, not the witness; he merely says what he knows. Therefore this rule of
evidence—if in view of this it may be properly called such—is somewhat different from
those which shut off certain facts actually probative of the issue. Moreover, it was
recognized comparatively early in the history of rules of evidence. For we find Vaughan,
C.J., that great defender of the right of juries to go “on their own knowledge,” well saying
in Bushell’s case in 1671: “The Verdict of a Jury and Evidence of a Witness are very
different things, in the truth and falsehood of them; a Witness swears but to what he hath
heard or seen, generally or more largely, to what hath fallen under his senses. But a
Juryman swears to what he can inferr and conclude from the Testimony of such
Witnesses by the act and force of the Understanding, to be the Fact inquired after, which
differs nothing in the Reason, though much in the punishment, from what a Judge, out of
various Cases consider’d by him, inferrs to be the Law in the Question before him.” The
distinction cannot be put more plainly.
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L.
REV. 40, 44–45 (1901) (footnote omitted); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After
Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of
Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2274–76 (1994) [hereinafter
Imwinkelried, The Next Step] (discussing common law limitations on opinion testimony).
12. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 701 comment that “necessity as a standard for
permitting opinions and conclusions has proved too elusive and too unadaptable to particular
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admitted even when the jury could resolve the issues without the assistance
of opinion.13
The common law also imposed additional restrictions if expert
testimony represented new technology or science.14 Key Supreme Court
decisions in the 1990s changed that approach to expert testimony, requiring
the trial court to assess the reliability of the expert’s approach before
admitting expert testimony.15 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.16 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,17 the Court reformulated the test

situations for purposes of satisfactory judicial administration.” 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11,
at 53–54 (discussing evolution away from necessity requirement); 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra
note 10, § 1401, at 591–94 (discussing evolution of the law); see also Asplundh, 57 F.3d at 1195–98
(discussing move from common law to rules); David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at
the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About
the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799 (1994) (discussing evolution of rules
from common law to Daubert); D. Garrison Hill, Lay Witness Opinions, S.C. LAW., Sept. 2007, at
36 (discussing South Carolina pre-rule law, which permitted opinion only if it was the sole way the
facts could be proven). But see Imwinkelried, The Next Step, supra note 11, at 2271 (suggesting that
lay opinion is admissible only if the witness cannot otherwise convey the information).
13. Rule 701 allows lay opinion if it will help the jury, and Rule 702 allows expert opinion if it
will assist the jury. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 55 (stating that Rule 701 “codifies
‘convenience’ as the standard” for lay opinion, rather than requiring strict necessity); 1
IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 1401, at 595–96 (noting that, in adopting the “helpfulness”
standard for lay opinion testimony, the federal drafters “explicitly rejected ‘necessity’ as the
standard”); Matthew J. Rita, Rule 701: Admissibility of Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses, 26
COLO. LAW., Mar. 1997, at 63 (suggesting that lay opinion is admissible even if the jury could
resolve the case without it).
14. Novel scientific evidence was subjected to the general acceptance test, established in Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923):
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id.; see also 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 606, at 200. Under the general acceptance
test, the trial court did not have to assess the expert’s approach for reliability, but instead turned to
the relevant discipline to determine the acceptance of the methodology.
15. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert
Testimony: A Partial Answer to the Questions Left Unresolved by Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 52
ME. L. REV. 19, 20–23 (2000) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability] (discussing
evolution of the law).
16. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See generally 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, §§ 613–16, at
219–34 (discussing the relevance and application of Daubert); THOMAS A. MAUET & WARREN D.
WOLFSON, TRIAL EVIDENCE § 2.3, at 16–17 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the new emphasis given the
“gatekeeper” function of federal judges following Daubert); David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses,
Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 467–72
(2008) [hereinafter Bernstein, Expert Witnesses] (describing the development of courts’ gatekeeping
role); Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 720–23 (1998) (discussing
gatekeeping role established by Daubert); Faigman et al., supra note 12, at 1811–22 (discussing
Daubert).
17. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). See Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament:
Determining “Reliable” Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended
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for admitting expert testimony. It concluded that the Federal Rules did not
codify the general acceptance test.18 Instead, the Court read Rule 702 as
requiring that expert testimony be reliable and imposing the role of
gatekeeper on the courts.19 In the wake of these decisions, there were heated
debates about how the courts should assess reliability and what types of
evidence were subject to the reliability assessment.20
The amendments to the rules on lay and expert opinion in 2000
responded to these decisions and the ensuing debate. The amendments
codified the reliability assessment for expert testimony, mandated that all
expert testimony be subjected to reliability assessment, and also established
a clearer line between expert and lay opinion testimony. The rules protect
against unreliable opinion testimony, whether lay or expert, and give the
court a significant role in assuring the quality of the evidence admitted in
each of the categories.21 The court should check the reliability of the way in
which the witness derived the opinion,22 and should also make sure that the

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 332–36 (2000) (discussing
Kumho); Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability, supra note 15, at 24–30 (discussing Kumho).
18. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587; see Graham, supra note 17, at 318–19 (discussing Daubert).
19. See United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1094 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing the court’s
gatekeeping function); see also STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 90–92
(discussing Daubert and Kumho); Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 467–72 (describing
development of courts’ gatekeeping role); Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, supra note 16, at 720–23
(discussing gatekeeping role established by Daubert); Jennifer Laser, Comment, Inconsistent
Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to
Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1379 (1997) (discussing Daubert before
Kumho was decided). The rule is arguably applied differently in criminal cases. Moreno, supra note
5, at 14–18 (suggesting that Daubert has had far less impact in criminal cases).
20. See Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 946 F. Supp. 1241, 1246–48 (M.D. La. 1996)
(discussing debate and citing cases); see also Walter G. Amstutz & Bobby Marzine Harges,
Evolution of Controversy: The Daubert Dilemma: The Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. to Expert Testimony of Law Enforcement Officers in Narcotics-Related Cases,
23 U. HAW. L. REV. 67, 78–84 (2000) (discussing debate); Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by
Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 80 (1998)
(discussing disagreement concerning which types of evidence are subject to Daubert analysis);
Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, supra note 16, at 738–51 (discussing applicability of Daubert to nonscientific expert opinion); K. Issac deVyver, Comment, Opening the Door but Keeping the Lights
Off: Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael and the Applicability of the Daubert Test to Nonscientific
Evidence, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 177, 183–85 (1999) (explaining the strong disagreement among
circuits, judges, and legal commentators about the scope of Daubert and its applicability to
nonscientific evidence); Laser, supra note 19, at 1389 (discussing debate).
21. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (recognizing courts’ gatekeeper role); see
also Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses, supra note 3, at 34 (discussing courts’
gatekeeping role for expert and lay opinion prior to amendment of rules).
22. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (recognizing the importance of assurance
of reliability).
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opinion is presented in a manner that permits the jurors to fairly evaluate it.23
In the subsections that follow, this Article outlines the rules governing lay
and expert opinion and defines the line between the two types of opinion.
A. Lay Opinion—Rule 701
Rule 701 governs lay opinion. The rule provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’[s]
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the
perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of
the witness’[s] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702.24
The rule defines four hurdles that lay opinion must clear to gain
admission: (1) the witness must speak from personal knowledge; (2) the
inferences reflected in the opinion must be rationally based on that
knowledge; (3) the opinion must be helpful to the jury; and (4) the opinion
cannot be based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.25
Thus, every lay opinion rests on a combination of the witness’s experience
base, information known to the witness, and a process of rational reasoning.
The assurance of reliability lies in these first three requirements. The fourth
requirement was added to the rule in 2000 in an effort to better demark the
line between expert and lay testimony.26 The court’s job when ruling on the
admissibility of lay opinion is to ensure that the opinion rests on a base of
personal knowledge and experience and is fairly derived from that base with
everyday reasoning.
Much of the routinely admissible lay testimony combines opinion and
non-opinion testimony, and in many instances, that distinction is
inconsequential.27 For example, lay testimony as to someone’s age, size, or
behavior involves both factual observation and opinion, but the court need
not decide which aspects of the testimony are fact and which are opinion.
Such routine lay opinion easily clears the hurdles established by the rule,

23. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (stressing that jurors should get sufficient
information to evaluate opinion); see also Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, supra note 16, at 705 (noting
the importance of providing opinion in a form that the trier of fact can evaluate).
24. FED. R. EVID. 701.
25. Id.
26. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note.
27. See generally Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (3d Cir.
1995) (discussing the common law rule and criticism and development of federal rule); 1 BROUN ET
AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 53 (discussing Wigmore).
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provided the witness speaks with personal knowledge or does not draw a
patently unwarranted inference.28
However, lay opinion is not always so routine. A witness with unusual
experience may be permitted to testify to a lay opinion based on that
experience.29 The concern with admitting lay opinion increases when the
opinion goes beyond routine information and expresses a more sophisticated
judgment pertinent to the case. If the court does not assure that the lay
opinion satisfies the requirements of the rule—that the witness has an
adequate basis in personal knowledge and is within the bounds of rational
inference—lay opinion may become a vehicle by which inadmissible
evidence is veiled and then presented to the jury.30 Lay opinion that does
not satisfy the rule’s requirements may inject unreliable inferences,
inadmissible hearsay or character evidence, or evidence that would normally
be excluded under Rule 403 as unfairly prejudicial into the testimony.
Careful enforcement of the rule’s requirements should avoid this hazard.

28. United States v. Yazzie, 976 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing admissibility of lay
opinion on question of apparent age). In the Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 amendment of
Rule 701, the committee stated:
The amendment is not intended to affect the “prototypical example[s] of the type of
evidence contemplated by the adoption of Rule 701 relat[ing] to the appearance of
persons or things, identity, the manner of conduct, competency of a person, degrees of
light or darkness, sound, size, weight, distance, and an endless number of items that
cannot be described factually in words apart from inferences.”
FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (quoting Asplundh, 57 F.3d at 1196).
29. See United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434 (7th Cir. 1996) (allowing former gang member
to decode conversations for the jury); Asplundh, 57 F.3d at 1198–201 (discussing examples); United
States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 156–57 (1st Cir. 1989) (permitting a drug user to testify as a lay
witness that white powder “looked and tasted” like cocaine, and noting that lay witnesses may testify
to subjects outside “the realm of common knowledge” based on the witness’s individual experience);
see also 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 1401, at 604 (suggesting that witnesses with
experience beyond common knowledge may be permitted to testify as lay witnesses rather than
expert witnesses); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL
§ 10.02[2][c], at 10-14 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2011) (noting that, even after the 2000
amendment to Rule 701, a witness who uses the processes of ordinary persons to form opinions
based on particularized experience and knowledge may testify as a lay witness). But see G. Michael
Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 939, 975–77 (1996) (discussing Asplundh); Graham, supra note 17, at 326 n.30 (2000)
(discussing Asplundh and arguing that the experienced witness should be treated as an expert).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing witness’s
reliance on information gathered by other law enforcement agents).
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1. Based on the Perception of the Witness
The lay opinion rule requires that a lay opinion be based “on the
perception of the witness.”31 This reflects a particular emphasis on the
personal knowledge requirement that is implicit throughout the Rules of
Evidence.32 A witness who rests her opinion on information from others in
addition to her own observations does not comport with the requirements for
lay opinion.33 Whereas an expert can rely on vicarious experience and
relayed information, a witness providing lay opinion can call only on
personal experience and personally observed facts.34

31. Id. at 211 (emphasis added) (discussing the personal perception requirement). The Second
Circuit emphasized that “lay opinion [is] an acceptable ‘shorthand’ for the ‘rendition of facts that the
witness personally perceived.’” Id. (quoting 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 701.03[1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2004)). In
Garcia, the court used the following example of acceptable shorthand:
To illustrate: when an undercover agent participates in a hand-to-hand drug exchange
with a number of persons, the agent may well testify that, in his opinion, a particular
participant, “X,” was the person directing the transaction. Such an opinion is based on
his personal perception of such subjective factors as the respect various participants
showed “X,” their deference to “X” when he spoke, and their consummation of the deal
only upon a subtly signaled approval by “X.” By allowing the agent to state his opinion
as to a person’s role in such circumstances, Rule 701 affords the jury an insight into an
event that was uniquely available to an eyewitness. In this respect, the rule recognizes
the common sense behind the saying that, sometimes, “you had to be there.”
Id. at 211–12; see also Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that
“perceptions” include the witness’s interpretation of personal sensory experience); 1 BROUN ET AL.,
supra note 3, § 11, at 57 n.30 (stating that the perception requirement “mandates that the opinion be
one which a lay person could normally form from observed facts”); 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra
note 10, § 1401, at 595 (discussing the perception condition and noting that it refers to the firsthand
knowledge requirement that is codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 602).
32. See Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing and
implementing personal knowledge requirement of Rule 701); United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 58,
67 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that witness lacked basis in personal knowledge to give opinion that
bulge in defendant’s pants, observed from some distance, was caused by a gun); Gorby v. Schneider
Tank Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that lay opinion was properly excluded
because witness lacked sufficient firsthand knowledge). McCormick emphasizes that the original
common law restriction on lay opinion was based in a concern that the witness not speak without
personal knowledge. 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 51–52. Federal Rule of Evidence 602
imposes a personal knowledge requirement on all witnesses except those who testify as experts.
FED. R. EVID. 602.
33. See Garcia, 413 F.3d at 211 (holding lay testimony based on information and opinion
gathered by numerous officers in the course of an investigation to be inadmissible under Rule 701’s
perception requirement); TLT-Babcock, Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 33 F.3d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting lay opinion testimony by a project manager based on reports from his staff); 1 BROUN ET
AL., supra note 3, § 10, at 48 (noting that testimony which rests on statements of others lacks the
requisite firsthand knowledge requirement); 3 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 701:1, at 11 n.2 (noting that
a lay witness offering an opinion must base that opinion on the witness’s “own personal
knowledge”).
34. See Garcia, 413 F.3d at 211; Bank of China v. NBM LLC, 359 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2004)
(noting that testimony not based on the witness’s perception should not have been admitted as lay
testimony); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho: Refocusing on the
Bottomlines of Reliability and Necessity, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 185, 203 (2000) [hereinafter
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2. Rationally Based on the Witness’s Perception
The rule further requires that lay opinion be “rationally based” on the
witness’s perception.35 The court’s job when applying this requirement of
the rule is to ensure that the opinion expressed by the witness is one that can
be drawn from the witness’s knowledge base using ordinary reasoning.36 If
the witness’s opinion represents too great a leap from the witness’s
knowledge base, the court should exclude it as not rationally based.37
3. Helpful
The rule also requires that a lay opinion be “helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’[s] testimony or the determination of a fact in

Imwinkelried, Taxonomy of Testimony]. Professor Imwinkelried points out that a key distinction
between expert and lay opinion lies in the permissible basis for the opinion. See generally infra
Section III (discussing significance of difference between lay and expert opinion).
35. FED. R. EVID. 701 (emphasis added). In United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241,
1246 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit assumed that scrutiny under the lay opinion rule was limited
to an assurance that the witness had observed the facts—“mere percipience”—and overlooked the
requirement that the opinion be rationally based on the witness’s perception.
36. The Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 amendment states:
The amendment incorporates the distinctions set forth in State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d
530, 549 (1992), a case involving former Tennessee Rule of Evidence 701, a rule that
precluded lay witness testimony based on “special knowledge.” In Brown, the court
declared that the distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay
testimony “results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life,” while expert
testimony “results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists
in the field.”
FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note; see also United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 119
(2d Cir. 2007) (noting that courts should ensure that opinion is rationally derived from witness’s
observation); Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1201 (3d Cir. 1995)
(emphasizing role of requirement that lay opinion be rationally based on witness’s perception).
Some commentators ascribe no independent significance to the rational relation requirement, but
simply treat it as part of the personal knowledge requirement. See 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra
note 10, § 1401, at 595 (discussing requirements for admissibility of lay opinion); see also Bigelow,
supra note 3, at 4–5 (discussing Asplundh); Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses, supra
note 3, at 34 (discussing Asplundh and characterizing this approach as injecting the Daubert
gatekeeping function into Rule 701).
37. Professor Imwinkelried captured this notion in his discussion of how a court should
approach the testimony of a witness who offers an opinion regarding habit. Imwinkelried, The Next
Step, supra note 11, at 2293–94. Professor Imwinkelried suggested that the trial judge can assess the
similarity of the observed behavior that provides the basis for the witness’s opinion on habit. Id. at
2294 (“If the judge’s common sense and intuition tell her that the experiences are not at all parallel,
the inference is acceptable neither as a matter of law nor as a matter of epistemology.”). Thus, he
called for the judge’s assessment that the opinion can be rationally derived from the witness’s
experience/personal knowledge base. Id.
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issue.”38 In some cases, the witness uses lay opinion to express information
that cannot be conveyed through a bare factual account.39 Even when the
witness can convey the facts without providing opinion testimony, lay
opinion may enrich understanding by adding depth and clarity to the
witness’s account.40
Nevertheless, an opinion is not helpful if it simply tells the jury what
inferences to draw41 or summarizes the party’s case.42 The concern that the
witness threatens the province of the fact finder may likewise lead to the
conclusion that the opinion is not helpful.43 For example, a witness who
opines that the defendant was a partner in a drug distribution, based on the
witness’s conclusions from recorded phone calls and other information
gathered in a criminal investigation, supplants the jury’s function of
determining the defendant’s culpability.44
Similarly, if the witness’s opinion merely applies everyday reasoning to
evidence equally available to the jury, the court may deem the opinion
unhelpful. For example, if the witness simply compares the defendant’s
appearance with a surveillance photo and opines that the defendant is the
person in the photograph, the court may reject the testimony as unhelpful
because the witness is no better equipped than the jury to draw that
conclusion.45

38. FED. R. EVID. 701(b); see also 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 55 (suggesting that
“value to the jury” is the “principal test” under the Rules); 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, §
1401, at 595–96 (discussing helpfulness assessment).
39. Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 629–30 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that the trial
court should not have excluded eyewitness testimony that a gun was fired accidentally, even though
it was “difficult . . . to articulate all of the factors that lead one to conclude a person did not intend to
fire a gun,” because the eyewitness testimony would have been helpful to the jury).
40. Id. at 630.
41. United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 749–51 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that lay opinion
testimony admitted at trial was improper because it merely told the jury what result to reach); see
also 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 12, at 61 n.12 (citing cases rejecting lay opinion on ultimate
issue as unhelpful).
42. United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding case agent’s summary
of the evidence in the case is not an admissible, helpful lay opinion). The Garcia court noted that
the agent’s summary replicated the role of the prosecution’s opening statement. Id. But see
Bigelow, supra note 3, at 5–8 (discussing use of summary witnesses).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir. 2011) (concluding agent’s
testimony was not helpful because it usurped the role of the jury); Garcia, 413 F.3d at 210–11
(emphasizing the need to protect the province of the jury, and the role of Rule 701’s foundation
requirements in protecting that province); Grinage, 390 F.3d at 750 (noting that agent’s testimony
concerning phone calls usurped the jury’s function); United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460, 1465
(9th Cir. 1993) (expressing concern that testimony may have invaded province of jury); Hand, supra
note 11, at 52.
44. See Garcia, 413 F.3d at 210–11.
45. See discussion infra Section III. For example, an expert can express an opinion that a nonexpert would not be permitted to draw. The expert can base that opinion on information that has not
been admitted, and is even inadmissible. See LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1465 (holding that police officer
should not have been permitted to give lay opinion that defendant was same person as person in
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4. Not Based on Scientific, Technical, or Other Specialized
Knowledge
In 2000, Rule 701 was amended to stipulate that lay opinion must not be
based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. The
amendment was intended to harden the division between lay opinion and
expert opinion, and to ensure that all opinion based on scientific, technical or
other specialized knowledge would be subject to the reliability requirements
of Rule 702.46 This aspect of the Rules is discussed further in the sections
that follow.
B. Expert Testimony—Rule 702
The Federal Rules of Evidence permit expert witnesses to testify in
ways that non-expert witnesses cannot.47 Before the court accords a witness
that latitude, it must ensure that the witness satisfies the requirements of
Rule 702.
Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles

photograph). But see United States v. Martin, 262 F. App’x 392 (3d Cir. 2008) (allowing similar lay
opinion testimony); Rita, supra note 13, at 64 (concluding that lay witness can sometimes testify
concerning identity of person in photo).
46. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 amendment comment that “Rule 701 has been
amended to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded
through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.” FED. R. EVID. 701
advisory committee’s note; see also Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 227–28 (3d Cir.
2008) (discussing purpose of amendment); Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar
Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2003) (commenting that the amendment to Rule 701
was intended to eliminate uses of Rule 701 to avoid reliability requirements of Rule 702); see also
Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses, supra note 3, at 34 (discussing reasons for
amendment of Rule 701).
47. See FED. R. EVID. 702–03. As the comment to the Rules reflects, expert witnesses can also
provide helpful non-opinion testimony. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (noting
additional role of expert beyond mere opinion testimony); see also John William Strong, Language
and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function, Reliability,
and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 360 (1992) (describing possible roles expert may play).
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and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.48
The rule as originally drafted demanded only that the expert’s testimony
“assist” the trier of fact.49 While the expert’s testimony still need not be
necessary to the resolution of the case in order to be admissible,50 the rule
now also requires assurance that the testimony is reliable. The 2000
amendment to Rule 702 incorporated the three specific requirements
intended to assure the reliability of expert testimony—the requirements of
sufficient facts or data; reliable principles and methods; and reliable
application.51
The amendment contemplates that the expert has employed reliable
methodology—something beyond everyday reasoning—to draw inferences
from the information base.52 A number of pre-amendment decisions clarify
the requirements for expert testimony. Both Daubert and Kumho Tire
addressed the question of what qualifies as knowledge and stressed the role
of methodology.53 In Daubert, the Court asked what qualified as “scientific
knowledge” admissible as expert testimony under the pre-amendment
rules.54 The Court concluded that the way in which “knowledge” was
derived was critical to whether it qualified as “scientific knowledge.”55 In
48. FED. R. EVID. 702.
49. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
50. 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 1404, at 612–13 (discussing Rule 702’s
requirement that expert testimony “assist the trier of fact,” and noting that the standard is more
liberal than the common law, which often required that the subject of expert testimony be “beyond
the comprehension of a layman”); Strong, supra note 47, at 354, 356 (discussing requirements).
51. FED. R. EVID. 702.
52. See LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 928–29 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying
criteria and concluding that witness did not satisfy requirements of rule); see also Brian Leiter, The
Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for Good
Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 815–17 (discussing limitations of judges as arbiters
of scientific reliability); Strong, supra note 47, at 354–56 (emphasizing role of expert in providing
reliable information both as a “check on jury notice of unreliable propositions” and as a source of
“evaluational or computational accuracy” beyond the jury’s capability).
53. Neither Daubert nor Kumho involved arguable lay opinion; both decisions addressed only
the reliability requirements for expert testimony. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
153 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 597 (1993).
54. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584–85.
55. Id. at 590. The Court explained:
The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science.
Similarly, the word “knowledge” connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation. The term “applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas
inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.” Of course, it would be
unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be “known” to a
certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science. But, in order to qualify as
“scientific knowledge,” an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific
method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., “good
grounds,” based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony
pertain to “scientific knowledge” establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.
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Kumho Tire, the Court recognized that an expert’s experience can play a role
in the testimony.56 The Court further emphasized that the experience of the
discipline may play a role in establishing the reliability of expert
testimony.57
In addition, of course, the witness must qualify as an expert. To do so,
the witness must possess scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge. The threshold for expertise was traditionally low.58 The
addition of the three reliability factors may have also increased the
requirements to qualify as an expert.59 Under the amended rule, the expert
witness must now be competent to apply reliable principles and methods and
to do so reliably.60 It will not be enough for the witness merely to have
some knowledge beyond that of the average juror.

Id. (citations omitted).
56. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 148–49. The Court explained:
[W]hether the specific expert testimony focuses upon specialized observations, the
specialized translation of those observations into theory, a specialized theory itself, or the
application of such a theory in a particular case, the expert’s testimony often will rest
“upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the jury’s] own.” The trial judge’s
effort to assure that the specialized testimony is reliable and relevant can help the jury
evaluate that foreign experience, whether the testimony reflects scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge.
Id. at 149 (quoting Hand, supra note 11, at 54).
57. The Court stated: “And where such testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, methods, or
their application are called sufficiently into question, the trial judge must determine whether the
testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.’” Id.
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
58. The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 702 states:
The rule is broadly phrased. The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not
limited merely to the “scientific” and “technical” but extend to all “specialized”
knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person
qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.” Thus within the scope
of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g. physicians,
physicists, and architects, but also the large group sometimes called “skilled” witnesses,
such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see also United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 849
(3d Cir. 1995) (applying traditional low standard); Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, Inc., 664 A.2d 525,
528 (Pa. 1995) (stating that the standard for qualification of expert witness is liberal, and stating that
the test is whether the witness has “any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the
subject”); 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 13, at 86; 2 WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 556, at 751.
59. McCormick cites “an incipient trend to toughen standards” in jurisdictions that have adopted
Daubert. 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 13, at 71; see also LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank,
374 F.3d 917, 928–29 (10th Cir. 2004) (requiring qualifications that equip witness to satisfy
reliability requirements); Moreno, supra note 5, at 12–14 (discussing amendment).
60. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
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C. Delineating the Difference
The comments to the Rules acknowledge that a witness with a deep
experience base may provide a lay opinion,61 and also that a witness may
Thus,
qualify to give expert opinion solely through experience.62
experience-based opinion may fall under either Rule 701 or Rule 702. When
a party seeks to elicit opinion testimony based on experience, the court must
determine which rule applies.
The line between lay and expert opinion has never been clearly drawn.63
Traditionally, there has always been an area of overlap between the two.64

61. The Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 amendment of Rule 701 remarks:
[M]ost courts have permitted the owner or officer of a business to testify to the value or
projected profits of the business[,] without the necessity of qualifying the witness as an
accountant, appraiser, or similar expert. Such opinion testimony is admitted not because
of experience, training or specialized knowledge within the realm of an expert, but
because of the particularized knowledge that the witness has by virtue of his or her
position in the business. The amendment does not purport to change this analysis.
Similarly, courts have permitted lay witnesses to testify that a substance appeared to be a
narcotic, so long as a foundation of familiarity with the substance is established. Such
testimony is not based on specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702, but rather
is based upon a layperson’s personal knowledge.
FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (citations omitted).
62. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. The Advisory Committee Note to the
2000 amendment of Rule 702 states:
Nothing in this amendment is intended to suggest that experience alone—or experience in
conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or education—may not provide a
sufficient foundation for expert testimony. To the contrary, the text of Rule 702
expressly contemplates that an expert may be qualified on the basis of experience. In
certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, basis for a great deal of reliable
expert testimony.
Id. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (no abuse of discretion in
admitting the testimony of a handwriting examiner who had years of practical experience and
extensive training, and who explained his methodology in detail); Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
946 F. Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D. La. 1996) (design engineer’s testimony can be admissible when the
expert’s opinions “are based on facts, a reasonable investigation, and traditional
technical/mechanical expertise, and he provides a reasonable link between the information and
procedures he uses and the conclusions he reaches”); see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 156 (stating
that “no one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on
extensive and specialized experience”).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 159 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the Federal
Rules blurred distinctions between lay and expert opinion); Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518,
528–29 (8th Cir. 1977) (concluding that witness with extensive experience could provide either lay
or expert opinion); see also United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D. Md. 2002) (discussing
line between lay and expert opinion in relation to horizontal gaze nystagmus test); State v.
Blackwell, 971 A.2d 296, 303–05 (Md. 2009) (discussing same).
It is worth noting that the line does not depend on categorization of the witness. The same
witness may provide some testimony as an expert and other testimony as a lay witness. See United
States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 403 (6th Cir. 2007) (commenting that the Rules “distinguish between
lay and expert testimony, not witnesses”); United States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir.
2005); Downeast Ventures, Ltd. v. Wash. Cnty., 450 F. Supp. 2d 106, 110–11 (D. Me. 2006);
Falconer v. Penn Mar., Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 190, 208 (D. Me. 2006). Moreover, the fact that the
witness could qualify as an expert does not foreclose the witness from giving lay opinion testimony.
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However, when the Federal Rules were amended to define the lay-expert
line more clearly and to subject expert opinion to reliability testing,
delineating the difference between the two categories of opinion became
critical. The amendments raised the bar for expert testimony, while also
seeking to eliminate the risk that expert opinion would fly under that
reliability radar and be admitted as lay opinion.65 The Rules define the key
question as whether the opinion rests on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge.66
Evaluating opinion testimony based on experience raises particular
questions: What constitutes the “specialized knowledge” that requires an
opinion to be handled as expert testimony under Rule 702 and what level of
special background or experience base is consistent with providing lay
opinion under Rule 701? Does the knowledge derived from an especially
rich experience base constitute “specialized knowledge” that forces the court
to evaluate the evidence under the reliability requirements of Rule 702? The
courts must differentiate between a lay opinion that rests on an unusually
rich experience base and an expert opinion based on experience. The courts
should not categorize an opinion as expert merely because the witness

See Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 403 (3d Cir. 1980) (fact that accountantwitness might have qualified as expert did not prevent witness from giving lay opinion concerning
lost profits). Thus, whether a given opinion is lay or expert depends on the basis and development of
the particular opinion.
64. 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 1401, at 603–04 (discussing overlap); Capra, The
Daubert Puzzle, supra note 16, at 768 (summarizing courts’ approach to overlap).
65. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see also United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d
201, 215 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of this final foundation requirement is to prevent a party from
conflating expert and lay opinion testimony thereby conferring an aura of expertise on a witness
without satisfying the reliability standard for expert testimony . . . .”); Bank of China v. NBM LLC,
359 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Advisory Committee Note that amendment of Rule 701 is
intended “to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded
through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing” and concluding that the
trial court had improperly allowed that to happen); Falconer, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 208 (“The
amendments to Rule 701 were designed to prevent ‘proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.’”); 4
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 31, § 701.03[4][b], at 701-30 (explaining that “[t]he purposes of
the amendment are twofold. First, it ensures that evidence qualifying as expert testimony under Rule
702 will not evade the reliability scrutiny mandated by the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision and
the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 . . . . Second, it also provides assurance that parties will not use
Rule 701 to evade the expert witness pretrial disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.” (footnotes omitted)); Martinez & ArlynPessin, supra note 3, at 30 (discussing purpose of amendment). Before the Rules were amended to
incorporate the reliability requirements, a debate raged concerning the application of the requirement
to nonscientific evidence. See, e.g., 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 1401, at 604–05
(discussing amendment); Imwinkelried, The Next Step, supra note 11, at 2283–90 (discussing
application of Daubert factors to nonscientific expert testimony).
66. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
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possesses an unusual level of experience. Only the application of a reliable
methodology—a proven analytical approach beyond mere everyday
reasoning—should qualify an opinion as expert rather than lay.67
III. THE LINE BETWEEN LAY AND EXPERT OPINION:
WHY DOES IT MATTER?
Each type of opinion offers advantages and disadvantages to the
proponent.68 The key differences are explored below. Section A examines
the way in which courts should approach opinion testimony depending on
whether it is lay or expert. Section B considers the difference in the factual
basis required for each type of opinion. Section C discusses the information
required to be disclosed to the court and the jury. Section D focuses on the
form of the opinion testimony. Section E describes the pretrial discovery
obligation that attaches to expert opinion and not to lay opinion. Finally,
Section F notes the deference accorded expert opinion.
A. Evaluation of the Opinion
The two types of opinion require quite different judicial scrutiny. The
court’s competence to scrutinize lay opinion is greater because it rests on
ordinary reasoning and not on the application of a specialized methodology.
For lay opinion, the trial court must ensure that the opinion is helpful to the
jury and reflects reasonable inferences. To do so, the court must determine
whether the witness could fairly draw the inferences by applying everyday
reasoning to the facts the witness knows in the case and the witness’s
experience base.
In contrast, if the witness offers expert opinion, the court must scrutinize
the witness’s claim to reliability by evaluating the methodology, the
sufficiency of the basis, and the application of the methodology. The court
must also determine whether the expert opinion will assist the jury. Thus,
while the court does not need to rise to the level of the expert and is not
invited to assess the reasonableness of the specific inferences, it must check
that the parameters assuring reliability are met.69
67. See Samuel R. Gross & Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Information and Expert Evidence: A
Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141, 146–47 (2003) (discussing the requirement of
validity and suggesting that the question is whether those in the field of expertise have the tools to
produce valid answers).
68. See 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 1401, at 604 (noting the consequences of
classification of opinion).
69. See Amstutz & Harges, supra note 20, at 80 (“The ‘gatekeeper’ function finds description in
Daubert, but it finds its source in Rule 702. Rule 702 makes the trial judge no less the gatekeeper
when counsel characterizes proffered expert testimony as ‘technical’ or ‘specialized,’ rather than
‘scientific.’” (quoting United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 1997) (Jenkins, J.,
concurring))); Beecher-Monas, supra note 20, at 65 (“The most important mandate of Daubert is
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B. Basis of the Opinion
The requisite basis for the opinion also depends on how the opinion is
classified. Lay opinion must rest on facts observed by the witness. As a
result, the witness testifying to lay opinion cannot consider any information
outside her realm of personal knowledge.70
In contrast, an expert witness can base an opinion on information that is
not within her personal knowledge and is not presented in court.71 The
expert can base her testimony on data that is conveyed to her rather than
observed by her, if the information is of the type relied upon by experts in
the particular field.72 Further, the information need not be admitted and may
form the basis of the opinion even if it is not admissible.73 For example, a
physician testifying about the permanence of the plaintiff’s injury may rely
on the results of tests that are not admitted in evidence.74 Thus, an expert

that judges must actively evaluate proposed expert testimony.”); Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, supra
note 16, at 735–38 (noting that the judge need not become a super-expert); Jeffrey M. Schumm,
Precious Little Guidance to the “Gatekeepers” Regarding Admissibility of Nonscientific Evidence:
An Analysis of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 865–66 (2000) (arguing
that as gatekeepers, federal judges may assess reliability as they see fit); Laser, supra note 19, at
1411 (noting the benefits of the court’s gatekeeping role, particularly the relief it offers the jury from
“weighing the credibility of highly specialized expert evidence,” and opining that because judges
must examine a witness’s methodology, expert witnesses will not be able to testify based only on
their credentials); Note, Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 2146
(2003) (explaining how the gatekeeping role of the courts has grown between Daubert and Kumho).
The Supreme Court emphasized that, as gatekeepers, judges must examine “the particular
circumstances of each case to determine whether the factors are reasonable measures of reliability.”
Schumm, supra, at 873 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). The
gatekeeping role of the judge, if “overly restrictive,” may negatively affect the role of the jury,
especially when the expert testimony is nonscientific. Id. at 890–91 (noting that, because the
reliability of nonscientific expert testimony is not externally tested, the jury is “just as qualified” as
the judge to evaluate, and warning that a rigorous application of the gatekeeping function by the
judge may lead to the judge taking on the role of the jury). The gatekeeping function “should not
expand the trial judge’s role, but rather assist the jury in fulfilling its responsibility.” Id. at 891.
70. See United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 2007) (pointing out that lay
opinion could not rest on facts not known to the witness and that lay opinion witness could not
testify to hearsay statements that provided basis for opinion).
71. See FED. R. EVID. 703, 705; see also United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197–99 (2d Cir.
2008) (discussing line between permissible and impermissible basis for expert opinion); Fenner,
supra note 29, at 978 (noting that experts can base their opinions on inadmissible evidence whereas
lay witnesses cannot); Gross & Mnookin, supra note 67, at 145–46 (discussing difference in basis).
72. See Fenner, supra note 29, at 978.
73. Id.
74. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 15, at 92 (stating that “an expert may give an opinion
based on facts and data” that are not admissible in evidence if “‘of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 703)). The Advisory Committee Note
accompanying Rule 703 comments:
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can draw on a wider range of information than a lay witness in the process of
forming an opinion.
C. Disclosure of the Basis to the Court and Jury
The party presenting expert or lay opinion has two disclosure
obligations. First, the party must provide enough information to the court to
persuade it that the opinion is admissible.75 Second, the party must present
enough information to the jurors to enable them to understand and evaluate
the opinion. The jury does not necessarily hear all the information provided
to the judge to inform the evidentiary ruling. The extent of the disclosure
obligations to both judge and jury depends on how the opinion is classified.
1. Disclosure to the Court
The proponent of expert testimony must provide extensive information
to the court. When a witness testifies as an expert under Rule 702, the court
has a substantial gatekeeper role.76 Before the jury is allowed to hear the
expert testimony, the court must determine that the expert has proper
qualifications, is using a reliable methodology appropriately, and is applying
it to an adequate basis.77 This assessment requires the proponent to inform
the court in some detail of the basis of the opinion and the process by which
it was reached.78 Without that detailed information, the court cannot
determine whether the expert witness has employed reliable methodology
and applied it reliably to a sufficient basis.79

The third source [of facts or data upon which expert opinions are based] contemplated by
the rule consists of presentation of data to the expert outside of court and other than by
his own perception. In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert
opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice into
line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court. Thus a physician in
his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of
considerable variety, including statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions
from nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X rays. . . . His
validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for
judicial purposes.
FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note.
75. See FED. R. EVID. 104; Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability, supra note 15, at 30–32
(discussing Rule 104).
76. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
77. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
78. See FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee’s note.
79. The Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 705 comments:
If a serious question is raised under Rule 702 or 703 as to the admissibility of expert
testimony, disclosure of the underlying facts or data on which opinions are based may, of
course, be needed by the court before deciding whether, and to what extent, the person
should be allowed to testify.
Id.
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In contrast, the proponent of a lay opinion must provide the court with
sufficient information to determine not only that the witness has personal
knowledge of the facts that form the basis for the opinion, but also that the
opinion is rationally related to those facts and that it is helpful to the jury.
Rule 701 directs the judge to assure herself that the witness’s inferences are
reasonably derived from the witness’s personal knowledge using only
ordinary reasoning processes.80 The judge cannot make that assessment
without knowing the witness’s knowledge and experience base.
2. Disclosure to the Jury
The jurors do not determine admissibility of evidence. Instead, they
assess its weight, ultimately deciding whether they are persuaded by all the
evidence introduced at trial to find in favor of the party with the burden of
persuasion. As a result, the party offering evidence does not normally
disclose to the jury all the information necessary for the judge to rule on
admissibility. Indeed, some of that information may be inadmissible.81
Although the party presenting an expert opinion must provide the court
with extensive information, the party does not ordinarily reveal the basis of
the opinion to the jury. The Rules both exempt and circumscribe the expert
from disclosing the basis of her opinion to the jury. The expert need not tell
the fact finder about the basis for an opinion as a prerequisite to expressing
that opinion.82 The proponent may elect to have the witness explain the
basis of the opinion to some degree. However, the Rules limit the extent to
which the expert can relay information on which the opinion is based, but
that has not been admitted, to the jury.83 Thus, the jury will often be in the
dark as to aspects of the basis for the expert opinion.

80. United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 2005).
81. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) provides: “Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court . . . . In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence
except those with respect to privileges.” The rule allows the court to consider information that is
neither admitted nor admissible, and therefore is not disclosed to the jury.
82. FED. R. EVID. 705 provides: “The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and
give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on crossexamination.”
83. Rule 703 was amended in 2000 to provide that “[f]acts or data that are otherwise
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the
court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.” FED. R. EVID. 703; see also Capra, The Daubert
Puzzle, supra note 16, at 774–80 (discussing reasons for limiting disclosure of expert’s basis to jury).
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Rule 701 does not specify whether the basis for a lay opinion must be
disclosed to the jury. However, logic dictates that the proponent must
provide the jury with enough information to allow the jurors to evaluate the
opinion and determine whether everyday reasoning supports the inferences
drawn from the facts observed by the witness. If the jury is not given
sufficient information about the basis for the opinion, the opinion will not be
helpful, since the jury’s only choice will be to take it or leave it. Thus, the
witness should present to the jury the information provided to the court in
support of admitting the lay opinion. The witness can give the jury an
overview of her basis for the opinion or can cite specific facts that support
the opinion.84 Correspondingly, if the witness relies on experience, she can
explain that experience to the jury.
D. Form of Testimony: The Hypothetical Question
There may also be differences in the way in which expert and lay
opinion are presented at trial. Traditionally, expert witnesses often gave
their opinion in response to hypothetical questions, a practice that is
permitted under the Rules.85 The hypothetical question posits the key facts
of the case to the witness as a hypothetical case and asks the witness to
express an opinion based on those hypothetical facts.86 An attorney
questioning a lay witness has less latitude to use a hypothetical.
Some courts have asserted that only expert witnesses are permitted to
answer hypothetical questions.87 In some cases, the personal knowledge
requirement for lay opinion forecloses the use of hypothetical questions. For
example, in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Sinkovich, the
plaintiff sued under an insurance policy covering his boat.88 At trial, the
insurance company’s investigator was precluded from testifying as an expert
due to the lack of pretrial notice.89 Nevertheless, the trial court permitted the

84. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 56 (suggesting that witness should provide as
much concrete information as possible).
85. See id. § 14, at 86–91 (discussing hypothetical questions as a vehicle for presenting expert
opinion).
86. See id. § 14, at 86–87; 31 AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 77, at 101–02 (2002).
87. See United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that
witness who was not testifying as an expert should not have been permitted to answer hypothetical
question and emphasizing that the distinction between lay and expert witnesses lies in the ability to
answer hypothetical questions); Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 404 (3d Cir.
1980) (stating “[t]he essential difference, however, is that a qualified expert may answer
hypothetical questions” (citing the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying Rule 703)); see also 2
WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 679, at 940 (stating that only skilled witnesses may respond to
hypothetical questions); Fenner, supra note 29, at 977 (stating that lay witnesses are generally not
allowed to respond to hypothetical questions).
88. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Sinkovich, 232 F.3d 200, 201 (4th Cir. 2000).
89. Id. at 203.
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investigator to respond to hypothetical questions concerning steps the
plaintiff could have taken to mitigate the damage to the insured boat.90 The
Fourth Circuit held that the testimony was improper coming from a lay
witness.91 There were two problems: first, in answering the question the
witness offered an opinion without personally observing the necessary facts,
and, second, the questioning led the witness into areas where he would have
needed expertise.92 The witness had not seen the accident and was not
familiar with the area in which it occurred.93 As a result, the testimony went
beyond that permitted under Rule 701.94
However, a blanket assertion that lay witnesses cannot answer
hypothetical questions is too sweeping to be accurate. There are instances in
which a hypothetical question can fairly be posed to a lay witness. Suppose,
for example, a witness testifies to the opinion that the deceased had the habit
of stopping at a particular restaurant for breakfast on the way to work every
weekday morning.95 The witness could then be asked, “If the deceased left
for work at the usual time on August 2, 2009, what time would the deceased
have arrived at the restaurant?” The question is posed as a hypothetical, but
calls for a conclusion within the witness’s competence and requires no
expertise.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 205–06.
92. Id. at 204.
93. Id.
94. Cf. United States v. Wiseman, 339 F. App’x 196 (3d Cir. 2009). In Wiseman, the trial court
permitted an underwriting manager to respond to a series of hypothetical questions even though she
had not been identified as an expert. Id. at 198. The court described the questioning as follows:
The Government solicited Beck’s opinion concerning what she would have done if she
had been presented with a loan application with similar representations of sale price and
present value. The Government asked: “Now, if you had all this information as indicated
in this chart, that you had done if you were associated with both of these loans and had
this information, what would you do with that loan?” The Government later continued:
“Now, let’s assume that as an underwriter or bank employee you have this information in
front of you. What, if anything, do you [do] with that loan file . . . ?” And concerning
the other property, the Government asked, “Now, I’ll ask you to assume for a moment
that [the property] is in one of the most distressed areas . . . . With that assumption in
mind, what do you do with the . . . loan file?”
Id. The Third Circuit declined to address the propriety of the testimony and held that, if error, it was
harmless. Id. at 199.
95. Federal Rule of Evidence 406 permits a witness to testify concerning habit. See
Imwinkelried, The Next Step, supra note 11, at 2293–94 (noting that before admitting evidence
under Rule 406, the judge must assess whether the witness has observed enough instances of conduct
to reach an opinion as to habit).
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E. Pretrial Disclosure Requirements
The rules of procedure in both civil and criminal cases mandate more
extensive pretrial disclosure for expert witnesses than for other witnesses.
The Rules require each party to designate its expert witnesses and provide
pretrial reports describing their testimony.96 In contrast, lay opinion may be
introduced with no advance notice. An undesignated witness may therefore
be limited to lay testimony.97
The disclosure obligation has frequently been the focal point of disputes
about the scope of the lay opinion rule. Thus, a party that did not provide
information about an opinion witness to the adverse party before trial may
try to avoid exclusion of the evidence by arguing that the witness is a lay
witness testifying to lay opinion. Conversely, the opposing party will argue
that the opinion is expert opinion and should therefore be excluded to
sanction the failure to comply with the discovery rules.98
The advance disclosure concerning expert witnesses protects the
opposing party.99 Having received pretrial notice, the opposing party can
prepare to respond to the expert testimony. As a result, courts may be
reluctant to treat opinion from an experienced witness as lay opinion because
it allows the party to circumvent the pretrial disclosure requirement.
However, the application of the rule of evidence should not be driven by
procedural considerations.

96. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2); Downeast Ventures, Ltd. v.
Wash. Cnty., 450 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111 (D. Me. 2006) (explaining the rationale for the disclosure
requirement: “The Rule and the Scheduling Order are designed to place the opposing party on fair
notice: once the expert’s qualifications and the bases for his opinion are disclosed, the opposing
party possesses the necessary knowledge to consider the potential impact and to decide how to
respond—to evaluate whether to engage in further discovery, such as a deposition, to investigate
whether the technical and scientific basis for the proposed testimony is sound, and to determine
whether to obtain a countervailing expert.”); see also Bigelow, supra note 3, at 8–10 (discussing the
disclosure requirement); Gregory P. Joseph, Emerging Expert Issues Under the 1993 Disclosure
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 164 F.R.D. 97 (1996) (discussing issues raised
by disclosure requirements).
97. Downeast Ventures, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 110–11. Professor Capra makes the point that “[t]he
difference . . . boils down to disclosure obligations.” Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses,
supra note 3, at 34.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2006) (addressing
defendant’s complaint that prosecution witness gave expert testimony without compliance with
disclosure rule); United States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2005); Sinkovich, 232 F.3d
at 203–04 (witness restricted to lay testimony due to lack of pretrial notice); Downeast Ventures, 450
F. Supp. 2d at 110–11 (noting that “prudent counsel will designate such a witness as an expert to
avoid the accusation that he has proffered ‘an expert in lay witness clothing’”); see also Martinez &
Arlyn-Pessin, supra note 3, at 28–29 (discussing the disclosure requirement).
99. See United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 24 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. FigueroaLopez, 125 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997) (prosecution’s use of lay witness rules “subverts the
requirements” of the pretrial discovery rule); Bamberger, supra note 5, at 871–77 (discussing
importance of pretrial disclosure).
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Deference Accorded Expert Opinion

A party may obtain the advantage of deference by designating a witness
as an expert and presenting opinion as expert rather than lay opinion. First,
the judge may not subject the witness’s reasoning process to close
consideration.100 Second, the witness’s opinion may gain enhanced
credibility, giving the opinion testimony more weight in the jurors’ minds.101
Finally, the party relying on the opinion may invoke the witness’s expert
status in argument, inviting the jury to ascribe greater weight to the
testimony because the witness is an expert.102
IV. THE ROLE OF EXPERIENCE IN ESTABLISHING
THE BASIS FOR OPINION TESTIMONY
The determination of whether an experience-based opinion is lay or
expert has significant consequences, yet categorizing such opinions poses a
particular challenge. Before the 2000 amendments, the line between lay and
expert opinion was less stark. Once a court concluded that a witness, like
Mona Lisa Vito of My Cousin Vinny, had unusual experience, the court
could allow the witness to express an expert opinion drawing on that
experience base without regard to whether the witness possessed a reliable
methodology or applied anything other than ordinary reasoning skills to the

100. See Moreno, supra note 5, at 5–7 (discussing inappropriate use of prosecution experts); Neil
Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1177
(2001) (summarizing studies and concluding that judges are not adept at evaluating expert
testimony).
101. See United States v. Webber, 259 F. App’x 796, 802 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that the trial
court instructed the jury that an agent had testified as an expert); United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d
893, 903 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting weight accorded expert testimony); United States v. Downing, 753
F.2d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that some expert testimony has an “aura of infallibility”);
State v. Blackwell, 971 A.2d 296, 308 (Md. 2009) (noting “aura of certainty” that attached to
officer’s testimony concerning horizontal gaze nystagmus test); Beecher-Monas, supra note 20, at 81
(discussing weight accorded to expert testimony); Moreno, supra note 5, at 8. If the court does not
use the term “expert” to label the witness, the enhancement effect is likely to be contained. See FED.
R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (cautioning against instructing the jury that the witness is an
“expert”); Charles Richey, Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of the Word
“Expert” Under the Federal Rules of Evidence in Criminal and Civil Jury Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537,
559 (1994). But see Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 100, at 1177 (summarizing studies of juror
comprehension and evaluation of expert testimony and concluding that jurors competently assess
expert testimony).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 2004). In Grinage, the court
noted: “[T]he Government in its rebuttal summation told the jury that ‘the agent has the background
to make interpretations,’ suggesting either expertise, for which he had not been qualified, or
investigative information not before the jury.” Id.
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knowledge base.103 The amendments hardened the line between the two
types of opinion testimony, raising the question of when experience alone
leads to the type of specialized knowledge that qualifies a witness as an
expert and requiring a different approach to experience-based opinion
testimony.
The amendments to the Rules direct courts’ attention to the reasoning
process employed by a witness in reaching an opinion.104 The Advisory
Committee’s notes on Federal Rule of Evidence 701 state that “the
distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay testimony
‘results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life,’ while expert
testimony ‘results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only
by specialists in the field.’”105 Thus, the distinction lies in whether the
witness’s reasoning process entails a reliable methodology beyond everyday
reasoning.106 A lay witness, however experienced, offers no methodology
beyond ordinary reasoning. An expert is equipped to draw more
sophisticated, yet still reliable, inferences.107 The crux of expert testimony is
that it presents inferences that are supported through the application of a
reliable methodology.108 Thus, the witness who relies on experience to
support an expert opinion cannot simply claim insights arrived at by
applying everyday reasoning to that experience base, but must explain the
methodology employed to reach that opinion.109 An experienced witness

103. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434 (7th Cir. 1996) (allowing former gang
member to decode conversations for the jury); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1496 (8th
Cir. 1994) (allowing former gang members to testify about the business of drug trafficking). After
Daubert was decided, but before Rule 702 was amended to require a demonstration of reliability for
any expert testimony, courts debated whether experience-based expert testimony was subject to
Daubert analysis at all. See generally Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 946 F. Supp. 1241, 1246–48
(M.D. La. 1996) (discussing debate and citing cases).
104. United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 2005). In Garcia, the court noted:
In this case, the government made no attempt to demonstrate that Klemick’s challenged
opinion was informed by reasoning processes familiar to the average person in everyday
life rather than by scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. . . . We hold that
the foundation requirements of Rule 701 do not permit a law enforcement agent to testify
to an opinion so based and formed if the agent’s reasoning process depended, in whole or
in part, on his specialized training and experience.
Id. at 216.
105. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (quoting State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549
(Tenn. 1992)).
106. See United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 404 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing that witnesses’
opinions were expert opinion because they rested on specialized reasoning process and not on
everyday reasoning).
107. McCormick explains: “The expert has something different to contribute. This is the
power—the knowledge or skill—to draw inferences from the facts which a jury could not draw at all
or as reliably.” 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 13, at 67.
108. See generally STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 113–22 (discussing the
development and validation of new methodology); Laser, supra note 19, at 1418 (discussing
meaning of methodology).
109. The Advisory Committee commented:
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who does not bring such methodology to bear should be subject to the
restrictions of the lay opinion rule.
The question for a court faced with an experience-based opinion is how
the experience informs that opinion. In considering that question and the
implications for admitting experience-based opinion, a court should be
guided by the rules governing the admissibility of similar evidence of
experience.
A. How Experience Informs Lay Opinion: Similar Happenings and Other
Act Evidence
All lay opinion testimony is based on experience. The lay opinion
witness brings life experience to bear on the observed facts and forms an
opinion rationally based on those facts.110 The witness draws conclusions
based on a background of experiencing similar happenings or events and
If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain
how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient
basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts. The trial
court’s gatekeeping function requires more than simply “taking the expert’s word for it.”
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d
1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We’ve been presented with only the experts’ qualifications, their
conclusions and their assurances of reliability. Under Daubert, that’s not enough.”). The Advisory
Committee also noted: “The more subjective and controversial the expert’s inquiry, the more likely
the testimony should be excluded as unreliable.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see
O’Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994) (expert testimony based on a
completely subjective methodology held properly excluded); see also Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999) (“[I]t will at times be useful to ask even of a witness whose
expertise is based purely on experience, say, a perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at
a sniff, whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field would recognize as acceptable.”).
The Advisory Committee cited lower court decisions to support the assertion that experience alone
may be sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert. However, those decisions suggest that expert
testimony must be based on something more than simply experience. For example, in United States
v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1159–61 (6th Cir. 1997), discussing the admissibility of handwriting
analysis, the court noted that the witness’s expertise was a product of knowledge, skill, education,
and training, as well as experience, and commented further that the witness explained his procedure
to the jury. Similarly, in Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 946 F. Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D. La. 1996),
the expert witness brought far more than experience to his testimony: he had both undergraduate and
master’s degrees in mechanical engineering; he had been employed for nine years by the Louisiana
Productivity Center, working in areas that included product development, quality control, and
manufacturing; he had an additional thirteen years of experience working at various companies in
design engineering; he had served as a consultant in the design of various machines and structures.
His proffered testimony concerning alternative designs was excluded because he had not applied his
methodology to a reliable base of information. Id. at 1250–52.
110. Professor Imwinkelried asserts that “one of the most fundamental tests of the reliability of
nonscientific opinion is whether it has any supporting experience, either personal or vicarious.”
Imwinkelried, The Next Step, supra note 11, at 2291. He goes on to cite Hume’s assertion that “the
trustworthiness of an inference depends upon ‘a repetition of similar’ experiences.” Id.
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applies everyday reasoning informed by that experience to form the
opinion.111 In order to determine that the opinion is rationally related to the
witness’s knowledge, the court must make sure that the witness has the
experience base, as well as the observed facts, to rationally derive the
opinion.112
The court should demand that the witness’s experience base include a
sufficient sample of similar events, and that those past events support the
witness’s inferences. Applying these criteria, courts have admitted the
opinions of unusually experienced lay witnesses, as well as the opinions of
witnesses with a more ordinary experience base.113 But the test is always the

111. See, e.g., Bank of China v. NBM LLC, 359 F.3d 171, 180–81 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
the witness who had acquired special knowledge when he conducted an investigation of the bank’s
dealings with the defendant could give lay opinion based on that knowledge, and allowing the
witness to testify concerning business community’s understanding, certain business concepts, and
what constituted fraud in the transactions with which the witness was familiar); United States v.
Jones, 24 F.3d 1177, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the defendant’s voice identification
witness was not an expert because he could point to no reliable methodology supporting his
testimony, but permitting him to testify to his lay opinion based on his aural comparison of the
defendant’s voice with that on recordings introduced by the prosecution). Jurors also bring
experience to bear on the case. See Taylor v. Sisto, 606 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the role
of experience in jurors’ assessments and holding that trial court committed error by instructing
prospective jurors that they would have to set aside all their experiences to serve on the jury);
Strong, supra note 47, at 353.
112. See, e.g., Bank of China, 359 F.3d at 180–81 (holding that the trial court had improperly
permitted the lay witness to testify to some opinions not clearly based on the witness’s perceptions);
O’Conner, 13 F.3d at 1106–07 (holding that the testimony of a physician claiming that he could
recognize radiation-induced cataracts was properly excluded where the expert did not ground his
opinion in the scientific literature and had only observed five cases of radiation induced cataracts).
113. Courts have traditionally permitted property owners or those intimately involved with a
business to provide lay opinion concerning the value of the property or workings of the business.
FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note; see, e.g., United States v. Wiseman, 339 F. App’x 196
(3d Cir. 2009) (holding that witnesses experienced in real estate were properly permitted to testify as
lay witnesses concerning loan process); LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 928–
30 (10th Cir. 2004) (summarizing precedent and holding that company president could have testified
to lost profits using ordinary techniques based on the company’s history, but could not testify to a
model concerning moving averages, compounded growth rates, and S-curves, or other technical,
specialized subjects in which he was not versed); Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar
Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that company’s employees
could properly testify as lay witnesses that company’s charges were reasonable); Asplundh Mfg.
Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1198–99 (3d Cir. 1995) (collecting examples); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Wanzer, 897 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that bookkeeper should
have been permitted to testify to lay opinion on the question of the profits from leases since she
personally kept the relevant records); Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399 (3d Cir.
1980) (holding that party’s accountant should have been permitted to provide lay opinion concerning
party’s lost profits); Falconer v. Penn Mar., Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 190, 208 (D. Me. 2006)
(concluding that witness’s experience in engineering business qualified him to testify as a lay
witness concerning engineering responsibilities); see also 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 10, at 51
(noting that a lay witness who was familiar with a business’s operation may be permitted to testify
concerning the business’s profits). But see Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 564 F.3d 207,
215 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding that lay witness lacked basis to express opinion concerning estimated
lost earnings and pension benefits); JGR, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 370 F.3d 519,
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same: whether the witness has enough personal information drawn from
experience and observation to reach the offered conclusion using everyday
reasoning.
Look for a moment at an example of routine lay opinion. Testimony
concerning the speed of a car is often cited as an example of unremarkable
admissible lay opinion.114 Most adult lay witnesses have a sufficient
experience base driving, riding in, and observing moving vehicles to be able
to draw a rational inference concerning speed. But consider a witness who
has lived her entire life in central Manhattan, does not drive, and has never
seen highway traffic. As an adult, she ventures for the first time into the
countryside and happens to witness a high-speed traffic accident. Should
she be permitted to testify that, in her opinion, the defendant’s car was
moving sixty-five miles per hour? She has no experience base that would
assure the accuracy of her opinion. While possessed of the necessary
personal knowledge of the traffic accident, she does not have the
accumulation of observed similar events necessary to legitimatize her
opinion by assuring that it is rationally based on her knowledge. Her
opinion should be excluded.115 Lay opinion should not be admitted without
the assurance that the witness has the requisite experience of observing
sufficient similar events to draw accurate inferences.
In some cases, the courts simply fail to apply Rule 701 with care. For
example, in United States v. Simas,116 the court held that agents had properly

525–26 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that accountant-witness could not provide lay opinion on lost profits
because he did not have personal knowledge of the plaintiff’s books).
114. See Bandera v. City of Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2003) (listing speed of a vehicle as
an example of the “limited” testimony permitted by Rule 701); Asplundh, 57 F.3d at 1197 (citing
speed of vehicle as quintessential lay opinion testimony); Clifford v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 371,
374 (Ky. 1999) (describing testimony about the speed of a moving vehicle as common lay opinion
testimony); 3 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 701:1, at 26 (including the speed of a vehicle in list of
common topics about which lay witnesses may testify); Imwinkelried, Taxonomy of Testimony,
supra note 34, at 194 (listing the speed of a car as an example of admissible lay opinion testimony).
115. See also 3 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 701:1, at 13 n.3 (discussing recluse who has no
experience driving or riding in a car and concluding recluse would not be able to testify as to the
observed speed of a car).
116. 937 F.2d 459, 464–65 (9th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Colón Osorio, 360 F.3d 48,
52–53 (1st Cir. 2004) (permitting officer to give lay opinion that gun possessed by defendant was
manufactured outside Puerto Rico and therefore had traveled in interstate commerce). In Colón, the
witness’s lay opinion masked underlying evidence questions. The court allowed the opinion because
the officer had visited the factory in Massachusetts where the gun was manufactured. Colón, 360
F.3d at 53. The information was “based on information gleaned from [the officer’s] personal
experience . . . and was arrived at ‘from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life.’” Id. The
officer did not see the gun manufactured, so he was necessarily relying on hearsay rather than his
own knowledge. It seems unlikely that a court would have permitted a non-law enforcement witness
to testify that a particular item was manufactured in a particular location simply on the basis of
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testified as lay witnesses concerning their understanding of certain
ambiguous statements made by the defendant. The court first noted that the
agents had heard the actual statements, and concluded that the personal
knowledge requirement of Rule 701 was therefore satisfied.117 The court
further concluded that the helpfulness requirement was satisfied simply
because the opinions would help the jury to make sense of the sometimes
incomprehensible statements of the defendant.118 However, the court failed
to implement the requirement that the opinion be rationally related to the
facts observed by the witness.119 The court should have required the
prosecution to demonstrate that, in addition to hearing the statements, the
agents had a background that allowed them to interpret those statements,
based on prior similar instances. If that background was lacking, the
opinions were not rationally derived and threatened to mislead the jury. The
court may have assumed that the agents based their interpretation on prior
similar conversations with the defendant, but by failing to articulate that
basis and the need for a rational connection between the opinion and the
observed facts, the court stripped Rule 701 of its intended role.120
The way in which experience informs lay opinion can be better
understood by looking at other evidence that samples experience as a way of
advancing fact-finding. To understand how courts should approach
experience-based testimony, one should consider how courts approach
evidence of similar happenings and other acts. These types of evidence
require special scrutiny as a prerequisite to admissibility. The same scrutiny
should be applied to lay opinion, which purports to draw inferences from
similar happenings or other acts.

having visited the factory. Courts have also allowed such testimony as expert testimony under Rule
702, although it is not clear how the testimony satisfies the reliability requirements. See United
States v. Cormier, 468 F.3d 63, 72–73 (1st Cir. 2006) (allowing agent to testify as expert regarding
origin of weapon); United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2001) (ATF agent’s
expert testimony regarding origin of weapon sufficient to establish interstate commerce element of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)). By treating the testimony as expert testimony, the courts allow the prosecution
to employ a witness with no special methodology to rely on records and conversations to state an
opinion, relieving the government of the obligation to obtain primary admissible evidence
concerning a gun’s origin.
117. Simas, 937 F.2d at 464.
118. Id. at 465.
119. Id.
120. See also United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 903–05 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding agent’s
testimony interpreting conversations largely admissible as lay opinion); United States v. De Peri,
778 F.2d 963, 977–78 (3d Cir. 1985) (allowing witness to interpret conversations without
considering basis for opinion). In some cases, courts allow this testimony as expert testimony.
Instead, it should be evaluated as lay testimony.
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1. Similar Happenings and Lay Opinion
Events that are not part of the matter on which a trial focuses are not
generally admissible.121 However, in some instances, such an event has
particular probative value and is admitted as a similar happening. The
analysis of similar happenings evidence provides a model for evaluating lay
opinion.
Admissibility of similar happenings and other events is governed by
Rules 402 and 403.122 Rule 402 provides that if evidence has probative
value, it is admissible unless otherwise excluded.123 The probative value of
other events generally turns on questions of similarity.124 Rule 403 permits
the court to exclude evidence on grounds such as the risk of unfair prejudice,
jury confusion, and waste of time.125 Similar happenings evidence often
generates one or more of these problems and may be excluded as a result.
While not generally admissible, similar happenings evidence may be
admitted to establish the existence of a defect or dangerous condition or to
prove notice of such a problem.126 For example, evidence of other auto
accidents at a specific point on a highway may act as evidence that the
stretch of road was defectively designed or constructed. But the other
accidents support that inference only if they happened under substantially
similar conditions. If the case on trial involves a fair weather accident and
the other accidents occurred during inclement weather, then the other
happenings have little probative value in the case on trial. If the court
admits evidence of the other accidents, the jury will apply everyday
reasoning to determine the probative value, but may be confused or unfairly
prejudiced because the other accidents are superficially similar, yet
dissimilar in key respects.127 Thus, to determine the admissibility of the
similar accidents, the trial court should scrutinize the offered evidence to
determine whether the similarities permit the jury to draw the desired

121. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5170, at 111–12 (1978).
122. Id. § 5170, at 116–18; see also Simon v. Town of Kennebunkport, 417 A.2d 982 (Me. 1980)
(discussing use of other accidents to prove defect in sidewalk and applying Rule 402 and 403 to
assess admissibility).
123. FED. R. EVID. 402.
124. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 196–200, at 788–808 (discussing criteria for admitting
similar happenings and transactions).
125. FED. R. EVID. 403.
126. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 200, at 802–04.
127. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 121, § 5170, at 114–16.
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inference and whether the evidence will generate too great a risk of unfair
prejudice or confusion.128
The process of evaluating lay opinion should follow a parallel path. The
court should determine the basis for the opinion—both the perceived facts
relevant to the case and the experience base of similar happenings that the
witness can bring to bear on the issue. The court should then ask whether
everyday reasoning could support drawing the proffered opinion from that
base of knowledge. One possible basis for rejecting the opinion is a
deficiency in the witness’s experience base. If the witness has not observed
enough similar happenings, the witness lacks the basis in personal
experience to draw the opinion.
Consider an example. Suppose the defendant attempts to elicit the lay
opinion that the plaintiff lost control of her car because it was snowing and
she was driving too fast for the conditions. If the witness had only observed
driving in snowy conditions on two prior occasions, the witness would not
have experienced enough similar situations to draw the desired conclusion
about the plaintiff’s driving. Like a jury confronted with improper similar
happenings evidence, the witness may be led to the opinion by superficial
similarity, confusion, or improper reasoning. Even if the witness observed
the entire accident, the witness should not be allowed to express that
opinion.
The lay testimony allowed in Soden v. Freightliner Corp.129 exemplifies
lay testimony that has a proper experience base. It illustrates the proper
relationship between similar happenings evidence and lay opinion. The
plaintiffs in Soden, Soden’s widow and children, alleged that a design flaw
in step brackets on the defendant’s truck had resulted in the death of Soden
in a fire that erupted after the truck he was driving rolled over.130 The trial
court permitted a witness with extensive experience servicing trucks to
testify concerning the damage to the fuel tanks he observed on that particular
truck involved in the accident, and also on two or three other trucks
manufactured by the defendant that he had seen following other accidents.131
The other accidents included one rollover and one or two jackknifes, and
none involved a fire.132 However, in each of the accidents, the witness had
observed puncture marks in the fuel tank near the location of the step

128. Id. §§ 5213–14, at 258–73.
129. 714 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1983).
130. Id. at 500.
131. Id. at 510–11.
132. Id. The witness testified that on the other occasions, he had “seen puncture holes in the fuel
tanks at the location of the step brackets” that were allegedly defective; that he had seen similar
holes in the fuel tanks of the plaintiff’s truck; that the brackets caused the fire and that their design
was dangerous; and that the plaintiff’s accident prompted him to modify the brackets by removing
the pointed ends. Id. On appeal, the defendant challenged only the witness’s opinion testimony on
cause and dangerousness. Id.
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brackets.133 The accidents were thus sufficiently similar on the issue of the
brackets’ design and the punctures they caused in the accident.134 The
differences in the way the accidents happened and the absence of fire did not
affect the witness’s ability to infer that the brackets tended to puncture the
fuel tank and were therefore dangerously designed.135 The evidence of the
similar events could have been admitted, and the lay opinion based on those
events was properly allowed.136
When a party offers lay opinion, the court should ask whether the other
events on which the witness bases her reasoning satisfy the criteria applied
to similar happenings. The trial court should assess the points of similarity
and difference to determine whether the events in the witness’s prior
experience have sufficient probative value, and determine whether the
differences undermine the probative value or inject confusion. When the
witness’s experience includes enough similar instances to support the
offered opinion, the witness should describe to the jury, at least in summary,
the similar happenings that form the experience base so the jury can then
determine the appropriate weight to accord the opinion. Unfortunately,
courts do not always include this step in their evaluation of lay opinion.137
2. Other Act Evidence and Lay Opinion
Lay opinion sometimes purports to draw conclusions about an actor’s
behavior based on that actor’s prior conduct. The witness takes what she
knows about the actor and uses that as a basis for interpreting the actor’s
behavior in the context of the case on trial. The courts should approach such
lay opinion cautiously. The law carefully circumscribes the use of character
and other act evidence.138 Lay opinion based on such evidence should be
subject to the same limitations.
The Federal Rules of Evidence strictly limit the use of a person’s
character or acts at other times as a basis for inferring action at the time in
question.139 The law generally prohibits proof of character—the type of
person someone is—as a basis for concluding how the person acted at the

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 510.
Id. at 511–12.
Id.
Id. at 512.
See infra Section VI.C.
See FED. R. EVID. 404.
See id.
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time in question.140 Other act evidence141 is restricted because of the risk
that the jury will use this evidence to draw inferences about the character or
conduct of the actor. The chain of inference, either from character to action
in conformity or from other acts to character to action in conformity, is
specifically prohibited by the Federal Rules of Evidence in most instances.142
Lay opinion regarding an actor based on the actor’s past conduct should be
held to corresponding limitations.
There are two ways an actor’s prior conduct may become admissible at
trial as evidence of the actor’s behavior—as evidence of habit or as the basis
for judging an actor’s character in the limited circumstances in which
character evidence is admissible.143 The rules governing habit evidence

140. See id.
141. Other act evidence refers to proof of the person’s conduct at some time other than events
that are the subject of the trial.
142. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). But see FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1)–(3), 413–15.
143. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) provides that evidence of a person’s character or a trait of
character is admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion in the following limited situations:
(1) Character of Accused. In a criminal case, evidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an accused and admitted under
Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the
prosecution; (2) Character of Alleged Victim. In a criminal case, and subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 412, evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first
aggressor; (3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1)–(3). In those instances, the party may establish character by calling an
opinion witness. See 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 804, at 341–51 (describing use of
opinion evidence to establish a defendant’s character). The party may also prove character with
evidence of reputation. FED. R. EVID. 405. See 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 804, at
342–45 (listing and describing the use of reputation evidence in establishing character of defendant).
Reputation represents a more filtered assessment of conduct over time. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra
note 3, § 187, at 746 (describing reputation evidence as the “preferred mode of proof of character”);
1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 804, at 344 (noting that all courts permit the use of
reputation testimony, and describing such testimony as “likely to be fairly trustworthy”). Also, if
character is an element of a claim or defense, the party can introduce specific instances of conduct to
allow the jury to infer character from past conduct. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 187, at
744–47 (noting that, when character is a material fact in a case, courts typically permit evidence of
specific acts); 1 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 405:2, at 919–20 (noting that specific instances of conduct
may be introduced into evidence whenever character is an essential element of a charge, claim, or
defense); 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 804, at 344 (stating that evidence of specific acts
are permissible when a defendant’s character is “an ultimate, material fact in the case”). The opinion
regarding the person’s character is based on the witness’s assessment of the person’s past behavior
in light of the witness’s experience of people in general. The character witness must have both a
sufficient sampling of the person’s conduct and sufficient relevant life experience to rationally
support the opinion. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 57 n.30 (stating that “a foundation
must be laid as to the witness’s personal knowledge of facts to which the observed facts are being
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relate closely to lay opinion. Proof of habit may be admitted to prove
behavior consistent with the actor’s habitual behavior only if evidence of the
actor’s past conduct establishes a pattern so regular and consistent that it
supports an inference about the actor’s behavior at the time in question.144
Habit may be established one of two ways. The party may prove enough
specific instances of conduct that the jury can fairly infer the behavior was
habitual. Alternatively, the party may present a witness who can testify to
the habit.145 The witness’s testimony takes the form of lay opinion and
should be assessed accordingly.146 To arrive at the opinion, the witness
applies ordinary reasoning and knowledge gleaned from experience with
other people to the witness’s observation of the actor. The witness must
have a large enough sampling of the behavior in question to rationally
conclude it is habitual.147 Thus, when determining whether habit evidence is
admissible, the court must ensure that the instances of similar behavior
presented to the jury or known to the opinion witness support the conclusion
about habit as an indicator of likely conduct at the time in question.

compared”); see also United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305, 1309–10 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In
Williams, the D.C. Circuit noted:
The Office of Legal Education of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys
provides guidelines to establish a proper foundation for the opinion testimony of a skilled
lay observer: 1. That the witness has, on prior occasions sufficient in number to support a
reasonable inference of knowledge of or familiarity with a subject, observed particular
events, conditions, or other matters.
Williams, 212 F.3d at 1309–10 n.6.
144. FED. R. EVID. 406 provides:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether
corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove
that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity
with the habit or routine practice.
145. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 195, at 786 (listing witness testimony and specific
instances as methods of proving habit, and noting that witness testimony is the most common
method of proof); 1 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 406:4, at 949 (noting that, while Rule 406 is silent on
the method of proof, the Advisory Committee’s Note to Proposed Rule 406(b) listed opinion
testimony and proof of “specific instances [of conduct] sufficient in number to warrant a finding [of]
habit” as methods of proof); 1 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 809, at 363 (listing specific
instances and opinion evidence as “recognized methods” of proving existence of habit).
146. See 1 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 406:4, at 951 (noting that a lay witness may provide
testimony regarding habit, and that such testimony must comply with the provisions of Rule 701); 1
IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 10, § 809, at 364 (stating that judges should determine the
admissibility of lay opinion using Rule 701 criteria).
147. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 195, at 786 (noting that there must be enough instances
to establish habit); 1 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 406:2, at 940 (stating that habit testimony is
admissible “only if a sufficient pattern of repeated responses is established”).
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Other act evidence may also be admitted if it is relevant for a noncharacter, non-conduct purpose.148 To admit other act evidence on this
basis, the trial court must determine that the evidence plays a non-character
role and will not simply be used as character evidence. Thus, the court has
to assess the connection between the other act evidence and the permissible
inference for which it is offered. Moreover, even if the evidence has
probative value for a non-character purpose, the court has discretion to
exclude the evidence if it is substantially more likely that the jury would use
it as evidence of character and action in conformity than for the permitted
purpose.149
Thus, other act evidence is subject to strict rules. In the situations in
which such evidence is admissible, the trial court is required to carefully
assess the basis for offering the evidence and its probative value for the
permitted purpose. Opinion testimony based on observation of past conduct
should be similarly scrutinized and restricted.150
3. Evidence of Third Party Conduct and Lay Opinion
Lay opinion is sometimes derived from assessments based on third party
conduct. The witness takes what she knows about the behavior of others and
uses that as a basis for interpreting or predicting the behavior of the actor in
question. The courts should approach lay opinion that rests on third party
conduct with particular caution. Evidence of third party conduct is rarely
admissible, and lay opinion based on such evidence should likewise be
restricted.
Evidence of a third party’s conduct provides little probative insight into
how someone else acted. Such use of third party conduct raises the concerns
underlying both evidence of similar happenings and evidence of the prior
conduct of the actor. Superficial similarity may draw the witness and the
jury to unfounded inferences. A witness using third party behavior to form
an opinion may over-generalize, reaching unsupported conclusions.
Take a simple example. Suppose the defendant crashes her car into a
tree, injuring a passenger in the car. Suppose also that two other drivers in
the previous six months crashed into the same tree and were shown to have
been negligent. Can the passenger-plaintiff introduce evidence of those

148. Other act evidence may also be admissible when it proves something other than character
and conduct in conformity, such as identity, motive, or knowledge. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
149. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” See also 1 GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 404:5, at 607 (discussing Rule 403).
150. Cf. Moreno, supra note 5, at 43–44 (suggesting that drug jargon testimony acts
impermissibly as evidence of bad character by suggesting to the jury that the defendant learned the
jargon while engaged in prior drug dealing).
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crashes and ask the jury to infer that, because those two drivers were
negligent, the defendant was also negligent? The answer is clearly no. If all
three drivers were driving rental cars, could the plaintiff introduce that
evidence and ask the jury to conclude that the plaintiff, having the use of the
rental car in common with the third parties, was therefore negligent? Again,
the answer is a clear no. While evidence of similar accidents may be used to
establish a static condition, such as defect in the design or maintenance of
the road,151 it cannot be used to prove the behavior of the plaintiff.
Correspondingly, a witness should not be allowed to base a lay opinion that
the defendant was negligent on the conduct or characteristics of the other
two drivers.
That is not to say that third party conduct is never relevant or that a lay
opinion based on third party conduct is never admissible.152 In some
situations, experience with the behavior of others can appropriately inform a
witness’s lay assessment. For example, the lay opinion that a person acted
intoxicated may be based entirely on the comparison of the person’s conduct
with that of intoxicated third parties observed by the witness at other
times.153 If the person in question exhibits similar behavior, the witness can
fairly opine that the person was intoxicated.154
When lay opinion rests in part on third party conduct, the court should
challenge and scrutinize the underlying chain of inferences. The court
should demand a very high level of similarity between the third party
conduct and that of the person in question. The court should also make sure
151. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 324.3, at 418 (discussing the admissibility of evidence
of similar accidents and injuries and the role the evidence may play).
152. In some cases, courts exclude testimony based on a third party that is relevant and would be
helpful to the jury. In Trevino v. City of Rock Island Police Department, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1206–
08 (C.D. Ill. 2000), the court rejected the testimony of a monocular police officer on a range of
issues relating to whether a monocular officer could appropriately perform the job of a police officer.
The court held that the witness did not qualify as an expert. Id. at 1208. Instead, the court should
have recognized the witness as an experienced lay witness and permitted him to testify concerning
his ability to execute specific tasks. The witness’s conduct could help the jury understand the extent
to which monocularism does or does not impede the ability to function as an officer.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Denny, 48 F. App’x 732, 737–38 (10th Cir. 2002) (upholding the
admissibility of a witness’s statement that defendant was “extremely intoxicated” as appropriate lay
witness testimony); Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995)
(listing lay witness opinion that an individual appeared drunk as exemplary of Rule 701 testimony);
State v. Hall, 353 N.W.2d 37, 43 (S.D. 1984) (upholding lay testimony of police officers that
defendant was intoxicated based on the officers’ previous interactions with intoxicated individuals).
154. Of course, even in these situations, an opinion based solely on comparison with third parties
who exhibited similar behavior by definition does not take into account the personal situation of the
actor and will be wrong if the symptoms are caused by insulin imbalance or some other condition
that manifests itself in similar symptoms. The use of reliable methodology, such as a blood test or a
breathalyzer test, will avoid this problem.
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that the inferences drawn from the third party conduct are fair in the context
of the particular case. In addition, the court should guard against the
possibility that the opinion invites the jury to view the person in question as
sharing character traits with the third parties and acting in conformity with
that character.
Unfortunately, courts sometimes admit opinion based on third party
conduct without adequate scrutiny.155 For example, courts routinely admit
law enforcement testimony concerning drug jargon, opining that the
defendant’s words were actually code or jargon for drug-related terms. The
opinion concerning the meaning of terms is based on having heard third
parties use them in a context that revealed their meaning to the witness, and
inferring therefore that the defendant is using the terms in the same way.156
This jargon testimony is merely lay opinion based on the conduct of third
parties. While the testimony may sometimes be admissible, the court should
ensure that the opinion witness has heard the exact jargon used in
sufficiently similar circumstances an adequate number of times to
reasonably infer that the defendant’s meaning is the same as that of the third
parties’ meaning.
B. How Experience Informs Expert Opinion
Most expert opinion also rests to some degree on the experience of the
witness.157 However, regardless of the extent to which an expert relies on
experience, the expert must demonstrate a reliable methodology.158
If the witness offers expert opinion, employing a specialized
methodology to develop inferences based in part on a rich experience base,
the court must inform itself about the methodology, assuring itself that the
methodology is reliable and was reliably applied to an adequate basis of

155. See infra Section VI.D.
156. United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167 WHA, 2006 WL 2699042, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
19, 2006) (describing manner in which law enforcement officer arrived at understanding of jargon).
In Diaz, although it treated the witness as an expert, the court recognized that jargon testimony rests
on “repetition and context” and properly held that the officer should not have been permitted to
testify to the meaning of a phrase he had never heard used before. Id. at *3–4.
157. See David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence in Flatland: The Geometry of a World Without
Scientific Culture, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 255, 259–60 (2003) (discussing basis for expert
testimony and noting that the “essence of the expert’s testimony is that this case is like other
similarly situated cases in the world”); Imwinkelried, Taxonomy of Testimony, supra note 34, at 204
(arguing that experts necessarily rely on “accumulated, vicarious experience” and not solely on
personal experience). But see David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the
Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 68 MO. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2003) (complaining that expertise
based on experience does not fit into the analytical framework of Daubert or amended Rule 702).
158. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (emphasizing reliability requirement).
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information relevant to the case.159 The court should ask what the witness
has done with the experience.
The line dividing expert opinion and lay opinion from a witness with
unusual experience is sometimes very fine.160 In United States v. Kayne, for
example, the jury needed help determining the value of the rare coins the
defendants had allegedly sold for inflated prices.161 The prosecution called
eight coin dealers to testify concerning the value of the coins, and the First
Circuit saw no error, noting that “[o]pinions of value are a traditional subject
of expert testimony.”162 The witnesses were experienced and explained their
methods of assessing value.163 The court did not elaborate on the witnesses’
methodology, but consider the possibilities: If a coin dealer merely assessed
value based on personal experience buying and selling similar coins, the
witness’s opinion should be treated as lay opinion. If the witness’s opinion
reflected the use of more far-reaching research and application of method,164
the witness should be evaluated as an expert.
V. THE RISK OF ADMITTING OPINION BASED ON EXPERIENCE ALONE
Whether or not a witness is an expert, a party may seek to gain an
advantage by pushing the limits of permitted opinion testimony. The risk
with all experience-based opinion is that the jury will defer to the witness’s

159. If the expert cannot demonstrate a reliable connection between the facts and the opinion, the
opinion should be excluded. See Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 277–79 (5th Cir.
1998) (concluding that trial court properly excluded aspects of opinion that were not shown to be
reliably grounded in science); Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert
Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 48–
60 (2003) (discussing evaluation of witness whose expertise is based in part on experience).
160. See, e.g., Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 591 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
witness whose professional experience included responsibility for safety of power facilities from
lightning was qualified to give expert testimony concerning the safety of the tower in which plaintiff
claimed to have been struck by lightning). The court did not elaborate on the witness’s experience.
Whether he was fairly treated as an expert would depend on whether he analyzed the tower’s safety
with the help of some reliable methodology acquired through his experience or whether he simply
used everyday reasoning and analogized from events in his experience.
161. United States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1996).
162. Id. at 11–12.
163. Id. at 12.
164. The witness could research the provenance of the coins and the price the coins would bring
in different geographic markets and at different times. See United States v. Numisgroup Int’l Corp.,
170 F. Supp. 2d 340, 346–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing the use of an expert witness with a history
of leadership and success in the numinstatic community to testify as to the grade and appraisal value
of fraudulent coins); see also 95 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts §§ 38–41, 44–57, at 271–80, 285–337
(2009) (providing history of coin appraisal and grading, including how a witness may be considered
an expert in the field, and the role of opinion testimony as to coin value).
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inferential process simply because the witness has superior information.165
A witness with a long history of observing a particular type of behavior may
draw conclusions based on those observations. However, experience alone
does not assure reliability.166 A rich experience base does not necessarily
sharpen the witness’s reasoning process, and may deepen the witness’s
bias.167
In addition, the admission of experience-based opinion creates the
opportunity for overreaching when courts fail to subject the opinion to
appropriate scrutiny. If the court fails to determine that the witness’s
experience base fits the issue and that the witness’s reasoning from
experience is reliable, a party may exploit the opportunity, pushing beyond
the fair use of the opinion witness. The party may use the opinion witness to
vouch for inferences only loosely supported by the evidence or add the
expert’s imprimatur to inferences more properly left for counsel’s
argument.168 The party may elicit testimony that goes beyond what can be
rationally inferred from the witness’s particular combination of experience
165. While recognizing that expert opinion may be based on experience alone, the Advisory
Committee cautions courts to approach such testimony with care. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory
committee’s note; see also Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 482–83 (discussing
experience-based expertise under Rule 702).
166. See Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 486 (recognizing that “connoisseur”
testimony may not be admissible under Rule 702 because its reliability cannot be shown); D.
Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science:
Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2002) (considering ways in
which inaccuracy affects forensic sciences).
167. See Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 564 F.3d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 2009); United
States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir. 1989). In Donlin, the Third Circuit stated: “When a lay
witness has particularized knowledge by virtue of her experience, she may testify—even if the
subject matter is specialized or technical—because the testimony is based upon the layperson’s
personal knowledge rather than on specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Donlin,
564 F.3d at 215. In Paiva, the First Circuit held that a drug user who had tasted and observed the
appearance of the questioned substance could properly testify to a lay opinion that it was cocaine.
Paiva, 892 F.2d at 157. The court stated:
Although a drug user may not qualify as an expert, he or she may still be competent,
based on past experience and personal knowledge and observation, to express an opinion
as a lay witness that a particular substance perceived was cocaine or some other drug.
. . . The liberalization of Rule 701 has blurred any rigid distinctions that may have existed
between lay witnesses and expert witnesses. . . . No longer is lay opinion testimony
limited to areas within the common knowledge of ordinary persons. Rather, the
individual experience and knowledge of a lay witness may establish his or her
competence, without qualification as an expert, to express an opinion on a particular
subject outside the realm of common knowledge.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Gross & Mnookin, supra note 67, at 156–58 (discussing the risk of
bias in law enforcement testimony based on experience); Moreno, supra note 5, at 30 (discussing the
hazards of reasoning from experience, which include the risk that the witness will rely on intuition or
will reach conclusions that are “personal, idiosyncratic, and subjective”).
168. See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 214 (2d Cir. 2005) (condemning the use of
introductory overview by opinion witness and remarking that “[t]he law already provides an
adequate vehicle for the government to ‘help’ the jury gain an overview of anticipated evidence as
well as a preview of its theory of each defendant’s culpability: the opening statement”).
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and observation, introducing opinion testimony that should not properly be
admitted.169
Courts should distinguish between applying ordinary reasoning to a
broad experience base and applying some reliable methodology informed by
a broad experience base.170 If the witness brings no reliable methodology
beyond everyday reasoning from observed similar situations to the proffered
opinion, the witness should be evaluated as a lay witness, subject to the
corresponding limitations. The court should question whether the opinion is
rationally based on the witness’s perception—whether it rests on inferences
fairly drawn from the witness’s experience—and the jury should be invited
to scrutinize the opinion in the same way.
In some cases, courts defer too readily to claims that a witness can draw
certain inferences based on experience. The courts should recognize that
mere experience, uninformed by methodological analysis, can lead to false
inferences.171 The very experience base that qualifies the witness may bias
the witness to view new situations through a distorted lens—swayed by an
anecdotal sense of what inferences can be drawn, but not by any reliable
method of approach.172

169. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 188–91 (2d Cir. 2008) (correcting trial
court’s erroneous admission of “expert” testimony that drew together hearsay from unspecified
sources to summarize the activity of the gang whose members were on trial, and noting “it is a little
too convenient that the Government has found an individual who is expert on precisely those facts
that the Government must prove to secure a guilty verdict—even more so when that expert happens
to be one of the Government’s own investigators”); United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724,
744–45 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that the prosecution’s expert witness’s testimony “essentially
amounted to an expert opinion that the items he himself had found in [the defendant’s] home
demonstrated a conspiracy to distribute cocaine”); see also United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244,
1264–65 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that trial court properly excluded witness’s testimony concerning
physical evidence that would be “expected” in case of rape).
170. Courts have recognized, for example, that witnesses with medical training and expertise
should not be permitted to present an opinion based on their anecdotal observations in their medical
practice. See David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2147–60 (1994) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence] (discussing cases); see also Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra
note 16, at 476–77 (giving examples of scientific opinions based on “educated guesses” rather than
reliable methodology and proven to be wrong).
171. See Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, supra note 16, at 720–23 (discussing the problems of
anecdotal information as a basis for reliable opinion). Professor Capra points out two problems with
anecdotal information: it may be too limited a sample to support the conclusion and it may be too
dissimilar to support the conclusion. But see Crump, supra note 157, at 26 (assuming that Freud’s
dream theories should be admissible and referring to the exclusion of fingerprint ID as
“nonsensical”). Professor Crump seems reluctant to entertain challenges to accepted “science” even
though it is not shown to rest on reliable foundation.
172. See United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that
government expert on drug jargon “appears at times to have interpreted cryptic language as referring
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Experience-based opinion may be skewed by perception bias—the
tendency to ascribe greater significance to observed facts than is
warranted.173 A witness who identifies with a particular point of view will
view the data through that prism, skewing the inferences drawn.174 As a
result, an untrained witness who has observed certain patterns may
overgeneralize, drawing bad conclusions. The witness may leap to
unwarranted inferences, ascribing more significance to the knowledge base
than it supports.175 Reasoning solely from experience, the witness may be
prone to biased conclusions. One role of reliable methodology is to
minimize the impact of bias.176
Another source of unreliability when a witness reasons from experience
to opinion without the benefit of reliable methodology has been referred to
as “post hoc reasoning.”177 Post hoc reasoning imputes significance to

to cocaine simply because he believed appellants to be cocaine traffickers” and condemning “[s]uch
circular, subjective reasoning”); see also Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 453–55
(arguing that modern rules for expert testimony are necessary due to adversarial bias on the part of
expert witnesses); Risinger et al., supra note 166, at 19–26 (discussing how bias impacts observation
and conclusions).
173. See KEITH A. FINDLEY, CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT: LESSONS FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESEARCH (B. Cutler ed., 2010) (discussing the problem of “tunnel-vision,” which leads law
enforcement officers and prosecutors to focus on information that supports their conclusion of a
defendant’s guilt while ignoring information that goes against the established conclusion);
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 122 (discussing the “willingness to ignore
base rate information in assessing the probative value of information” and noting, for example, that
the significance of finding carpet fibers that match those in the suspect’s home depends on the base
rate—the rate at which those fibers are found in other homes); Moreno, supra note 5, at 39
(addressing the threat of prejudice posed by a law enforcement officer who offers expert testimony
based solely on subjective on-the-job experiences); see also United States v. Murphy, 457 F. Supp.
2d 1228, 1231 (D. Kan. 2006) (acknowledging that a witness’s bias may cause the court to enforce
requirements for expert testimony more strictly).
174. The committee that undertook a study of forensic sciences for the Academies of Science saw
bias as a sufficiently large problem and they recommended research on “human observer bias and
sources of human error in forensic examinations.” STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note
6, at 24, 122–24 (discussing the role of bias and recommending a study of the issue and steps to
reduce the impact of bias); see also Angela Fagerlin et al., Reducing the Influence of Anecdotal
Reasoning on People’s Health Care Decisions: Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Statistics?, 25 MED.
DECISION MAKING 398, 398–99 (2005) (explaining the tendency of anecdotal information to
influence medical decisions); Emily L.B. Lykins et al., Beliefs About Cancer Causation and
Prevention as a Function of Personal and Family History of Cancer: A National, Population-Based
Study, 17 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 967, 972 (2008) (explaining how beliefs concerning cancer are
influenced by personal and family history of cancer). One may also hypothesize that experts will
intentionally manipulate the evidence if courts do not adequately check for reliability. See Laser,
supra note 19, at 1409.
175. Bias may lead one to become anchored to an early conclusion or to “see patterns that do not
actually exist.” STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 123–24.
176. Id. at 122 (discussing bias).
177. See Bernstein, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, supra note 170, at 2147–49 (discussing
post hoc reasoning).
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observed events that is not statistically warranted.178 Only the application of
reliable assessment can assure the court that the opinion witness is not
engaging in such faulty reasoning. Consider again the example of a law
enforcement witness who testifies that the defendant’s use of a rental car
indicates that defendant is an experienced narcotics trafficker.179 The
agent’s opinion ascribes criminal significance to facially neutral conduct.
The agent did not bring any special methodology to the opinion interpreting
the defendant’s conduct; the agent brings only experience—repeated
observations of similar conduct—and pooled information gathered from
other law enforcement agents. Both the agent and the sources of the pooled
information are biased sources. The result may be a biased and unwarranted
opinion. Before allowing the opinion, the court should analyze it closely.
The testimony of this law enforcement witness should not be viewed as
expert opinion.180 No methodology plays a role in arriving at the conclusion
that use of a rental car suggests an experienced drug dealer. In addition to
the witness’s own observations of this and of prior drug transactions, the
witness may have obtained information from other agents either anecdotally
or through some sort of training classes. In effect, these amount to a single
argument: that the witness is an expert by virtue of access to the law
enforcement community’s pooled information.
But the collective
information is derived from pooling experience-based knowledge and
beliefs, without subjecting the information and conclusions to testing under
the lens of some reliable methodology. The reasoning underlying the expert
opinion, while collective, is familiar lay reasoning applied by a group that is
biased by its focus on investigation of narcotics trafficking: “We have seen
this happen often enough that we think it is significant in this particular
way.” The court should not allow that conclusion to be presented to the jury
without scrutinizing its foundation and justification. Before allowing this as

178. See id. (discussing illustration of a physician who observes a small sample of children who
develop a brain tumor after receiving measles vaccine and infers a causal relationship). Professor
Bernstein criticizes the courts for accepting such reasoning too readily, noting that family physicians
often gave such testimony. Id. at 2145.
179. United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Capra,
Distinguishing Between Lay Witnesses, supra note 3, at 3, 34 (discussing Figueroa-Lopez). In
Figueroa-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit rejected the prosecution’s argument that the opinion was
admissible as lay opinion, but held that the opinion would be admissible only if the witness was
qualified as an expert. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d at 1247.
180. See United States v. Moore, 521 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that to arrive at the
conclusion that only guilty people are present at a drug deal, the law enforcement expert “assumes
that everyone present is culpable and uses that assumption as the ‘proof’ of culpability,” and
condemning the reasoning as unreliable).
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expert opinion, the court must demand that some reliable methodology be
employed to counteract the effect of inferences drawn by biased observers.
The agent’s opinion should be evaluated as lay opinion. The court
should gather enough information about the agent’s experience base to
assess the relationship between the information known to the agent and the
proffered opinion, asking if the agent’s conclusion is rationally related to the
facts perceived. The court cannot properly evaluate the opinion without
information about the frequency of drug deals not involving rented cars, the
frequency and characteristics of drug deals involving rental cars, and the
frequency of use of rental cars for other purposes in the relevant community.
The court can assure that the witness’s opinion is fairly grounded in
observed facts and not skewed by the witness’s bias only if it is fully
informed on the underlying basis.
VI. SCRUTINIZING EXPERIENCE-BASED OPINION:
APPLYING RULE 701 WITH BITE
Courts often fail to subject experience-based opinion to proper scrutiny
under either the standards for lay opinion or those for expert opinion. At
times, courts accept too readily claims that a witness’s unspecified
experience base supports the inferences expressed in a lay opinion. At other
times, courts inappropriately accept claims that a witness has developed
relevant expertise from experience alone. In both situations, juries are
permitted to hear unsupported opinion testimony that should be deemed
inadmissible.
The following subsections detail five steps the courts should take to
control the use of experience-based opinion testimony. These steps should
be added to the comments to Rule 701 to provide stronger protection from
unfounded and unreliable opinion testimony. First, instead of treating
witnesses as experts by virtue of their experience and training, the court
should evaluate them as experienced lay witnesses. Second, the court should
not take at face value claims of expertise based on training or shared
experience; such claims may reflect nothing more than a set of unreliable
beliefs shared by a particular group. Third, the court should scrutinize
opinions informed by the witness’s experience, asking if the witness’s
experience base includes enough similar observations to support the
witness’s opinion. Fourth, the court should limit the extent to which a
witness can base an opinion on the conduct of unrelated third parties.
Finally, the court should check the inferences drawn from experience and
prohibit over-claiming, preventing the witness from drawing broad,
inadequately supported opinions.
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A. Evaluate Experience-Based Opinion as Lay Opinion
The lay opinion rule provides the preferred framework for analyzing
experience-based opinion because every lay opinion represents the
application of ordinary reasoning to the witness’s cumulated experience to
inform personal observation.181 Accordingly, the courts should scrutinize
these opinions to ensure that they are rationally derived from the witness’s
experience base using everyday reasoning. Thus, the opinions of the
witnesses described in the hypothetical cases at the beginning of this
Article—Mona Lisa Vito, the law enforcement witness with experience in
drug cases, and the witness whose opinion rests on experience with
motorcycles—should be evaluated as lay opinion. Only when the witness
brings a reliable methodology to bear on the experience should the witness’s
testimony be evaluated under the rules governing expert testimony.
Specifically, the rules governing lay opinion should constrain opinion
testimony from witnesses who base their opinions on a deep experience
base, but no reliable methodology, by ensuring that the opinion is rationally
related to the witness’s knowledge and experience.
In some cases, courts erroneously admit opinion evidence that should be
excluded because it fails to satisfy the requirements for either lay or expert
opinion.182 In Satcher v. Honda Motor Co.,183 for example, the plaintiff

181. This will allow the proponent to present the opinion testimony without complying with the
pretrial disclosure rules applicable to expert testimony. See discussion of pretrial disclosure rules
supra Section III.C.2. The opposing party’s protection will lie in the trial court’s careful assessment
of the opinions offered and the court’s discretion to permit the opposing party additional time to
prepare cross-examination or obtain a responsive witness.
182. See, e.g., Betterbox Commc’ns Ltd. v. BB Techs., Inc., 300 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 2002). In
Betterbox, a trademark infringement case tried before the amendments to Rule 702 went into effect,
the Third Circuit affirmed the admission of expert testimony based on experience, but acknowledged
that there was no showing of reliable methodology. Id. at 328–29. While an expert could apply
reliable methodology to determine the likelihood of confusion, these experts did not, so their
testimony should not have been admitted as expert testimony. Id. at 329–30. Nor was it clear that
their testimony satisfied the requirements for lay opinion. Id.
The testimony of forensic experts also poses problems that should be addressed by more
exacting application of the rules governing lay and expert opinion. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 127–82 (challenging the reliability of a number of forensic sciences);
Beecher-Monas, supra note 20, at 74 n.126 (demonstrating the lack of reliability of bite-mark
evidence that is routinely admitted); Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 459–61 (forensic
testimony); Simon A. Cole, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Thinking About Expert Evidence as
Expert Testimony, 52 VILL. L. REV. 803, 819–22 (2007).
Arson testimony illustrates the way in which courts have accepted claims of experiencebased expertise and admitted unfounded expert opinion where evaluation of the experience as a basis
for lay opinion should have prompted the courts to exclude the evidence. See STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 173 (discussing the unreliability of arson expertise); David
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claimed that the motorcycle he had been riding at the time of his injury was
not crashworthy, alleging that it should have had crash bars. At trial, the
efficacy of using crash bars was disputed.184 To support his claim, the
plaintiff called a former police officer as an expert to give his opinion that
the crash bars used on police motorcycles were “effective in reducing
injuries.”185 The witness had no formal training that would give him
expertise in motorcycle design.186 His claim to expertise lay in his nine-year
service on the police motor squad and his investigation of hundreds of
motorcycle accidents.187 The witness brought no methodology to bear on his
assessment, but merely drew inferences based on his experience.188 Thus,
his opinion was based on his application of everyday reasoning to draw
inferences from the many similar happenings he had observed. The trial
court allowed this witness to testify as an expert that, based on his
observations, he had the impression that crash bars provided effective
protection of the rider’s leg.189 The court should have instead scrutinized
and excluded the testimony as lay opinion.190
Low-level experience-based experts, such as law enforcement officers
with some experience in drug enforcement, who have been treated as experts
in the past, are unlikely to satisfy the reliability requirement now imposed on
expert testimony.191 While they possess an unusual knowledge base as a
result of their experience, they apply no methodology beyond everyday
reasoning to draw inferences from their experience, and their opinions

Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 42
(discussing the unreliability of arson evidence).
183. 52 F.3d 1311, 1313 (5th Cir. 1995).
184. Id. at 1316. One manufacturer, Harley-Davidson, recommended against the use of crash
bars on police motorcycles. Id. at 1316–17. Engineering experts had conducted tests to determine
whether crash bars increased safety, with mixed results. Id. Some engineering tests suggested that
the utility of the crash bars depended on the precise nature of the motorcycle accident. Id.
185. Id. at 1316. The court held that permitting the witness to testify as an expert was not error.
Id. at 1317–18. The court provided the following account of his testimony:
Kenneth Harms, a former Miami police chief with experience on the motorcycle patrol
and in investigating motorcycles accidents, believes that police crash guards, particularly
those used on Harley-Davidson motorcycles, are effective in reducing injuries. Harms
conceded that he had no scientific or engineering expertise in motorcycle design. HarleyDavidson has expressly recommended against the use of crash bars on its police
motorcycles.
Id. at 1316.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1317–18. It was not clear that he had any experience with Honda motorcycles. See id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. The experts who testified disagreed about the use of crash bars and testified that the utility of
crash bars depended on the precise type of motorcycle crash. Id. at 1317. As a result, it seems
unlikely that the court would have permitted a lay witness, however experienced, to offer an opinion
on the safety of the motorcycle design. See id.
191. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
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should therefore be evaluated as lay opinion. This approach will preclude
reliance on information that has not been admitted in formulating their
opinions; to the extent the witness has relied on information that has not
been admitted, the witness must satisfy the reliability requirements applied
to expert opinion.192 Their depth of experience may qualify such witnesses
to help educate the jury, but their lack of methodology should foreclose them
from expressing expert opinions.
Courts have often allowed law enforcement witnesses to testify as
experts, expressing their opinions concerning the significance of the
defendant’s conduct or use of language.193 These witnesses rely on their

192. See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 216 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that the agentwitness’s testimony “depended, in whole or in part, on his specialized training and experience” and
therefore must be evaluated as expert testimony); Martinez & Arlyn-Pessin, supra note 3, at 28
(suggesting that the amendment to Rule 701 will modify the practice of allowing a lay witness to call
on special knowledge in forming opinions). This Article addresses only the issues that arise when
the witness is asked to give an opinion. If the witness simply shares her experience or specialized
knowledge with the jury, the problem may not arise. For example, in United States v. Caballero, the
defendants argued that certain prosecution witnesses should have been treated as experts even
though they had not expressed opinions. United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir.
2002). The defendants suggested that the witnesses were experts merely because they “presented
specialized knowledge, and because their testimony was based on their perceptions, education,
training and experience.” Id. The witnesses testified concerning INS procedures and also
summarized the defendants’ bank accounts and files. Id. The court distinguished between opinion
and other testimony and rejected the defendants’ argument, because the witnesses “expressed neither
a lay nor an expert opinion, as distinguished from a statement of fact as to what they had witnessed
during their respective careers.” Id. at 1247; see also United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316 (11th
Cir. 2006) (allowing FBI financial analyst to testify as a lay witness to review and summarize
voluminous records from the defendant’s company). In Hamaker, the Eleventh Circuit did not view
the witness’s testimony as calling on any expertise. The court stated:
To prepare for his testimony, Odom simply added and subtracted numbers from a long
catalogue of MCC records, and then compared those numbers in a straightforward
fashion. As Odom himself explained at trial, while his expertise and the use of computer
software may have made him more efficient at reviewing MCC’s records, his review
itself was within the capacity of any reasonable lay person.
Hamaker, 455 F.3d at 1331–32. The mere fact that the witness summarized records did not convert
him into an expert. Id.
193. See United States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that agent was
properly allowed to testify to drug jargon); United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir.
2003) (discussing admissibility of expert testimony on drug operations and drug jargon); United
States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (summarizing the range of subjects on which
prosecution experts have been permitted to testify in narcotics cases); People v. Barnes, 19 Cal. Rptr.
3d 229, 237–40 (Ct. App. 2004) (discussing admissibility of drug profile evidence). In Watson, the
Third Circuit stated:
The courts that have considered this issue have recognized the operations of narcotics
dealers as a proper field of expertise. It is well-established that government agents may
testify to the meaning of coded drug language under Fed. R. Evid. 702. United States v.
Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d
587, 590–91 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Price, 76 F.3d
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experience and training to support their opinion testimony.194 They do not
employ any reliable methodology.195 Instead, law enforcement witnesses

526 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting
that the jargon of the narcotics trade and drug dealers’ code language are proper subjects
of expert opinion), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060, 119 S. Ct. 1376, 143 L. Ed. 2d 535
(1999); United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); United States
v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). In addition, “experienced
narcotics agent[s] may testify about the significance of certain conduct or methods of
operation to the drug distribution business, as such testimony is often helpful in assisting
the trier of fact understand the evidence.” United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321
(5th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1283 (5th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1132, 115 S. Ct. 2011, 131 L. Ed. 2d 1010 (1995)). Thus, the
operations of narcotics dealers have repeatedly been found to be a suitable topic for
expert testimony because they are not within the common knowledge of the average
juror. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 590–92. Therefore, we reject Watson’s argument;
knowledge of the operations of narcotics dealers is a proper field of expertise.
Watson, 260 F.3d at 307.
194. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 364, 373 (2d Cir. 2008) (law enforcement witness
permitted to testify as expert because of his lengthy experience); United States v. Throckmorton, 269
F. App’x 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that officer testified as an expert because he “brought
the wealth of his experience as a narcotics officer to bear” and holding that agent’s opinion should
not have been admitted in the absence of proper pretrial notice).
195. See Amstutz & Harges, supra note 20, at 74–75 (discussing credentials of law enforcement
experts); Moreno, supra note 5, at 21–22, 33–35 (discussing lack of reliable methodology underlying
drug jargon expert testimony). Amstutz and Harges suggest the following questions as the gauge of
reliable law enforcement methodology:
[ ] To your knowledge does your department or agency subscribe to what the education in the
field of narcotics in law enforcement suggests?
[ ] Does your agency often conduct investigations with other local, state or federal agencies?
[ ] Does your agency and/or the officers involved exchange current information regarding
narcotics-related information?
[ ] As a result does your department or agency keep current with changes in the field regarding
narcotics-related information?
[ ] Does your department use the suggestions and/or information from other agencies to update
its own practices in narcotics-related matters?
[ ] Would that information entail changes in the law?
[ ] Would that information entail changes in the way you conduct investigations?
[ ] As a result of the changes in procedures and/or tactics of narcotics traffickers does your
department also change in response to current narcotics activities?
[ ] Does your department and/or agency engage in activities and or investigations from which
to derive input or criticism for future operations?
[ ] Is there a school or academic facility that teaches such tactics or changes in tactics?
[ ] What agencies are identified as the leaders in teaching narcotics-related tactics and
techniques?
[ ] Have you or your department received specialized training by those agencies?
[ ] Do you often exchange information with the staff or agents of those agencies either in a
classroom setting or field setting?
[ ] Is that in an effort to develop a peer review of the practices currently in place?
[ ] Has your methodology been subjected to peer review?
[ ] Are the practices you use currently used by other experts in the area?
[ ] Has your technique or methodology been generally accepted in the relevant community?
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apply familiar reasoning to their experience base, and any expression of
opinion should be scrutinized under Rule 701 as lay opinion.196
For example, in United States v. Garcia,197 the Second Circuit
concluded that the witness called on “specialized knowledge” when he
testified to his opinion that the defendant was a partner in a drug
transaction.198 The court supported its conclusion by stating that the

[ ] Has your technique or methodology been derived naturally and directly out of research you
conducted independent of this litigation, or have you developed your opinions expressly for
purposes of testifying?
[ ] Have you adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations than yours?
[ ] Is your field of expertise known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion given?
Amstutz & Harges, supra note 20, at 96–97. The suggested questions test the witness’s experience
and access to pooled information, but do not target any reliable methodology.
196. See United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 2002). In Glenn, the trial court allowed
a prosecution witness who had observed the defendant from some distance to testify that the bulge in
defendant’s pants shortly before the defendant allegedly shot the victim was a gun. Id. at 66. The
Second Circuit held that the testimony was not proper. Id. The witness lacked the personal
observation required for lay opinion, but was also not qualified to provide expert opinion. Id. at 67.
The court noted that the witness “did not arrive at his conclusions through reliable principles or
methods but through casual, sporadic observations of drug dealers over some unspecified time
period.” Id. Drug identification testimony also poses a particular problem. In some cases, lay
witnesses have been permitted to draw on their experience with drugs to identify a questioned
substance. See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 464 F.3d 976, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
lay witness was properly allowed to give opinion that substance was marijuana given her experience
with marijuana and her multi-sensory opportunity to observe the questioned substance); United
States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir. 1989) (permitting lay witness to express opinion that
substance was cocaine based on her personal experience with drugs). Courts should proceed
cautiously in this area. In the absence of chemical analysis, no witness should be permitted to testify
to a substance’s identification; instead, a witness should be restricted to the opinion that a substance
“appeared to be” a particular substance. An experienced lay witness cannot rationally arrive at a
more definite opinion using everyday reasoning due to the fact that other substances may mimic
illegal drugs. Furthermore, training in drug related law enforcement does not qualify a law
enforcement officer as an expert in drug identification. Only scientific methodology can reliably and
definitely identify a questioned substance as a particular drug.
197. 413 F.3d 201.
198. Id. at 216–17. In Garcia, the court summarized the basis of the witness’s testimony and
concluded he had testified as an expert:
Klemick testified that his opinion as to the various conspirators’ roles was based on
“intercepted phone conversations and research of law enforcement databases and
surveillance.” Focusing simply on the wire intercepts, we observe that Klemick’s review
of these conversations was hardly that of an average person. To highlight this very fact
for the jury, the government specifically elicited that Klemick had reviewed thousands of
intercepted conversations in the course of various narcotics investigations, and that he
had had the benefit of cooperating witnesses’ insights on some of these occasions. Based
on this experience, certainly outside the ken of the average person, Klemick informed the
jury that he did not expect to overhear explicit references to drugs on the intercepted
tapes; his experience taught him that drug dealers generally used code words when
referring to their illicit transactions. . . . Further, based on his “training and experience,”
Klemick knew that when targets discussed kilogram quantities of drugs, that meant they
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witness’s reasoning process was that of a narcotics officer, not an average
person.199 To the contrary, while the witness had a broader experiential
background than most lay people, he employed the basic analytical approach
of making inferences from that experience base and the observed facts.200
Such testimony should be evaluated as lay opinion.
In some instances, assessing the testimony as lay rather than expert
opinion would lead to its admissibility.201 For example, in United States v.

were likely acquiring drugs for distribution rather than personal use. When he overheard
references to dollar amounts, he could assess their significance in light of his specialized
knowledge that the price for a kilogram of cocaine in the New York market at the
relevant time was $20,000 to $30,000. . . . Training and experience had further taught
him that quality could affect where within this range cocaine was priced, as could the
number of middlemen in the distribution chain between the foreign supplier and the New
York purchaser.
In sum, when Klemick concluded from wiretaps, database information, and surveillance
observations, that Garcia was a “partner” with Valentin in receiving cocaine from
DeArmas, and that his responsibilities included testing the quality of the cocaine, his
reasoning process was not that of an average person in everyday life; rather, it was that of
a law enforcement officer with considerable specialized training and experience in
narcotics trafficking.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Watson, 260 F.3d at 307–08 (permitting three
agents to testify as experts on the basis of their experience).
199. Garcia, 413 F.3d at 217.
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 662–63 (8th Cir. 2008) (experienced
drug enforcement agent testified that cash was wrapped in Saran wrap to mask the odor to prevent
detection by police dogs, that packages of cocaine were coated in grease to mask the smell, and that
pieces of tinfoil had been used to smoke cocaine); United States v. Vesey, 338 F.3d 913, 916–18
(8th Cir. 2003) (discussing admissibility of testimony from defense witness who was an experienced
drug dealer and confidential informant). In Spotted Elk and Vesey, the witness’s experience would
have provided the basis for lay opinion, and his testimony should not have been assessed as expert
testimony. See Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641; Vesey, 338 F.3d 913; see also United States v. Lee, 339
F. App’x 153 (3d Cir. 2009). In Lee, a government agent was permitted to testify as an expert on the
basis of “specialized knowledge of drug distribution networks and narcotics trafficking.” Lee, 339
F. App’x at 158. The court summarized the witness’s testimony as follows:
Agent Parks testified on aspects of drug trafficking in the Philadelphia area, none of
which are common knowledge among lay persons serving as jurors. Among other points,
Agent Parks testified regarding the manner in which heroin is typically packaged,
bundled, stamped and sealed in the Philadelphia area, how many individual packets are in
a bundle, and how those packets and bundles of packets are usually priced. Specifically,
Agent Parks testified that heroin typically costs between $70 and $90 dollars per gram,
and that, based on his conversations with the DEA lab, the amount of heroin in a bag
generally varies from .03–.05 grams, resulting in an average of .04 grams. Agent Parks
further testified that resellers typically purchased heroin in bundled format, as opposed to
individual packets. In addition, Agent Parks testified to some of the common names for
heroin in the Philadelphia area, including “dope” and “H.” Agent Parks also testified
concerning the relationship between resellers and suppliers, explaining that money may
be paid to the supplier up-front, at first, but that the reseller may be “fronted” the heroin
once trust is established between the two.
Id. at 159. The defendant complained that the witness’s “expertise was merely to repeat information
that unidentified others communicated to him.” Id. at 158. The defendant further pointed out that
the witness had no methodology or claim to expertise based on personal extensive experience. Id.
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Oriedo,202 the trial court allowed the agent to testify based on his own
observations that cocaine is packaged by cutting the end off a baggie and
then twisting or tying the drug into the removed corner of the bag.203 On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the testimony should have been
evaluated as expert opinion and should have been excluded because the
prosecution had failed to disclose it before trial.204 Instead, the court of
appeals should have affirmed the admission of the evidence as permissible
lay opinion. The agent based his testimony on his personal observations and
experience, invoked no special methodology, and testified to an opinion that
was fairly derived using everyday reasoning.205
Even the scholarly discussion does not get this issue right. Academics,
as well as courts, cite the three examples discussed below—the perfume
smeller, the beekeeper, and the farmer—as examples of experience-based
expert opinion. Categorizing these witnesses as experts ascribes too much
value to the witnesses’ experience and illustrates inappropriate deference to
claims based on experience in the absence of methodology. In most
instances, these witnesses provide opinion derived through everyday
reasoning by bringing their experience base to bear on observed facts.206

The court held that the witness was properly qualified by specialized experience. Id. at 159. The
court described the witness’s training and experience as follows:
Parks, an FBI agent for over eleven years, testified that he received training in narcotics
and drug distribution organizations, participated in over 100 narcotics investigations, over
100 related searches, and wiretaps covering thousands of conversations concerning drug
activity, and that he debriefed numerous drug dealers and individuals involved with drug
distribution. In addition, Agent Parks testified that he consulted manuals and guidelines
issued by the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) and the FBI to stay current.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that through such practical
experience and training, Agent Parks gained specialized knowledge in the field of drug
distribution networks and narcotics trafficking. That this was Agent Parks’s first time
testifying as an expert does not undermine those qualifications.
Id. The court did not address the reliability requirement of Rule 702 and did not explain how the
witness satisfied that requirement. A better approach would have been to assess the opinion under
Rule 701. The witness’s testimony could be admitted as lay opinion given the witness’s experience.
202. 498 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2007).
203. Id. at 602–03.
204. Id. at 604.
205. See also United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 364, 373 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing a law
enforcement witness whose opinions were based on what he had seen and not what he had been
told). In Lopez, the court should have concluded that the investigator’s opinion was admissible lay
opinion, provided he could cite sufficient instances in which he observed similar paraphernalia being
used in drug distribution.
206. See also Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 191, 233–36 (2003) (discussing example of “gestalt expert” who testifies to the value of
property based only on a combination of experience and a visit to the property). Like the other
examples, this gestalt expert is better viewed as an experienced lay witness who assesses value based
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Their testimony should be evaluated as lay opinion, scrutinized accordingly,
and excluded unless the court determines that the witness’s experience
supports the opinion through the application of everyday reasoning.
The perfume smeller: Some have suggested that a witness who has deep
experience as a perfume smeller should be permitted to provide an expert
opinion.207 Instead, the witness is an example of a lay witness with unusual
experience. The witness does not draw on any broad field of research,
collective knowledge, or specialized method of analysis. To the contrary,
the claimed basis for the ability to form an opinion is the witness’s personal
experience of olfactory observation, a store of similar happenings. The court
should decide whether the witness’s particular experience base and the
witness’s sniffing of the scent in question permits the witness to form a
rationally based opinion as to the identity of the questioned scent.208
The beekeeper: The beekeeper has also been cited as a witness whose
experience would support the expert opinion that bees always take off into
the wind.209 The beekeeper’s claim to expertise is based on his extensive

on similar and dissimilar properties. The witness should be able to explain the points of similarity
and difference to demonstrate how the other properties’ prices lead to the opinion concerning the
value of the property in question.
207. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999) (referring to the perfume
sniffer expert); Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 484–85 (discussing perfume sniffer
example); Crump, supra note 157, at 15. Crump also cites a garage mechanic’s testimony
concerning the price of repairs. Crump, supra note 157, at 15.
208. Interestingly, there is reliable methodology that could substitute for the sniffer’s experiencebased identification of the smell. See Raffi Khatchadourian, Annals of Science: The Taste Makers,
NEW YORKER, Nov. 23, 2009, at 85 (discussing experienced tasters and smellers and a scientific
means of assessing smells through the use of a Virtual Aroma Synthesizer, which chemically
analyzes scents). Another example of the use of smell to form an opinion can be found in cases in
which police officers testify that they recognized the scent of burning marijuana. To establish the
foundation for that opinion, the officer, sometimes visibly uncomfortable, must establish familiarity
with the scent. The officer may testify, for example, that the police periodically burn seized
marijuana so they will recognize the scent. This testimony establishes that the officer has a
sufficient experience base to express a lay opinion on the question, but does not demonstrate
expertise.
209. For example, in Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349–50 (6th Cir. 1994), the Sixth
Circuit explained:
The distinction between scientific and non-scientific expert testimony is a critical one.
By way of illustration, if one wanted to explain to a jury how a bumblebee is able to fly,
an aeronautical engineer might be a helpful witness. Since flight principles have some
universality, the expert could apply general principles to the case of the bumblebee.
Conceivably, even if he had never seen a bumblebee, he still would be qualified to testify,
as long as he was familiar with its component parts.
On the other hand, if one wanted to prove that bumblebees always take off into the
wind, a beekeeper with no scientific training at all would be an acceptable expert witness
if a proper foundation were laid for his conclusions. The foundation would not relate to
his formal training, but to his firsthand observations. In other words, the beekeeper does
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experience observing bees.
Unless the beekeeper brings reliable
methodology to bear on the question of whether bees always take off into the
wind, the beekeeper’s opinion should be governed by the lay opinion rule.
The court should determine whether the beekeeper’s experience includes
enough observations of bees taking off in varying conditions to reasonably
draw the conclusion. The court should scrutinize the opinion, recognizing
that the testimony is based on anecdotal, impressionistic observation and
may also be influenced by beekeeper lore—the possibly inaccurate shared
belief that bees always take off into the wind.
An expert opinion concerning these flight patterns must be derived
through reliable methodology. To bring such methodology to bear on bee
behavior to determine whether bees always take off into the wind,
researchers could subject bees to systematic observation.210 Bee takeoffs
into the wind and not into the wind could be counted and analyzed. If only
into-the-wind takeoffs were observed, statistical analysis could assess the
likelihood that the observations were the result of chance.211 The resulting
data would support an expert opinion.
The farmer: The farmer who offers an opinion concerning the most
effective methods of shoring an irrigation ditch or the effectiveness of
specific fertilizers has also been advanced as an example of an experiencebased expert.212 Like those discussed above, this witness should be treated
as a lay witness testifying based on unusual personal experience.

not know any more about flight principles than the jurors, but he has seen a lot more
bumblebees than they have.
See also United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1158 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing beekeeper example and
quoting Berry to explain why handwriting witness should be permitted to give expert opinion);
Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 480 (discussing beekeeper as example of “connoisseur
testimony”).
210. Hives and bees in locations away from the hive could be filmed over a period of time and in
a variety of conditions.
211. See Moreno, supra note 5, at 33–35 (suggesting how methodology could be applied to drug
jargon testimony).
212. Professor Imwinkelried, asking whether a witness should be permitted to testify to an
opinion based on “a ‘few’ instances of supporting experience,” turns to the example of a farmer
offering testimony concerning fertilizer. Imwinkelried, The Next Step, supra note 11, at 2290–91.
He concludes that a farmer, offering the expert opinion “that a particular chemical compound is one
of the effective fertilizers for a particular crop” in the county, should be permitted to testify even if
he has only a few confirming experiences. Id. at 2291. Imwinkelried bases his conclusion in part on
the limited nature of the opinion, noting that the witness “is not claiming that the fertilizer in
question is the only effective one or the one universally used.” Id.; see also Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v.
Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir. 1985) (admitting testimony of neighboring farmers who had
experience growing corn on land similar to the defendant’s as expert testimony on the question of
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The farmer uses everyday reasoning and does not bring any reliable
methodology to bear. The farmer merely applies ordinary reasoning to draw
inferences from her experience base. As a lay witness, the farmer should not
be permitted to express the opinion unless her experience base—the number
of similar and dissimilar events the farmer has observed—is sufficient to
give rational support to the opinion. The court should assure itself that the
combination of observed facts and experience permits the witness to draw
the opinion using everyday reasoning. If the witness’s experience is too
limited, either because the farmer has observed too few relevant events or
because the farmer’s experience base is too skewed to similar or dissimilar
events, the court should exclude the opinion testimony.
B. Be Skeptical of Claimed Expertise Based on Shared Experience
Another risk when a witness offers experience-based opinion is that the
witness will draw on information pooled by those with related experience,
but not subjected to reliability testing. When a witness in a field without
methodology claims expertise based in part on “training,” the training may
consist merely of a formal process for sharing experiences and the inferences
drawn from those experiences.213 This pooled information, not tested for
reliability, is inadmissible hearsay and could not be presented to the jury.
The court should not permit the pooled information to be admitted through
opinion testimony, either explicitly as the stated basis for the opinion or
implicitly by presenting the opinion without elucidating the basis.
The extrapolation of inferences by applying ordinary reasoning to
anecdotal information is not generally permitted.214 Lay opinion must be
based on the witness’s own experience and knowledge, not on information
relayed from others. Furthermore, the mere sharing of information does not
transform the witness’s opinion from a lay opinion into an expert opinion.
For example, suppose a witness owns and drives a particular make and
yield). The testimony would better be analyzed as lay opinion, permitting the witnesses to testify on
the yield from defendant’s land if they had sufficient similar observations to support the opinion.
213. See United States v. Lee, 339 F. App’x 153, 158–60 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding expert
testimony by a law enforcement agent, based largely on his access to pooled information and general
experience in the police force, and stating that in the absence of methodology, reliability focuses
mainly on personal knowledge or experience); United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 364, 373 (2d Cir.
2008) (upholding the expert testimony of a law enforcement officer without reliable methodology,
based on experience and information gained during his time as a detective investigating drug crimes,
including information learned from other agents, as well as his own personal experience); United
States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that Rule 702 qualifications have been
interpreted liberally, often allowing expert testimony by law enforcement officers based on training
and experience, rather than methodology); United States v. Poulsen, 543 F. Supp. 2d 809, 810–11
(S.D. Ohio 2008) (stating that experience-based expert testimony may satisfy the Daubert reliability
requirement, and upholding the testimony of an FBI agent based solely on his training and
experience, and not scientific methodology).
214. See discussion of similar happenings supra Section IV.A.1.
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model car and has felt the car pull to the left when she applies the brakes—
her personal experience base. Suppose that she has also spoken to others
with the same car and they have reported the same effect, and, further, that
she has looked at online sources that report this effect. That added
information does not qualify her to give an expert opinion on the braking
action.215 Moreover, the additional information is inadmissible hearsay and
cannot inform the witness’s lay opinion. To admit a lay opinion based on
such pooled information would inject a possible source of unreliability that
neither the court nor the jury could adequately assess.
Allowing an experience-based witness who possesses no reliable
methodology to testify as an expert and rely on pooled information generates
an even greater risk of unreliability. In United States v. Lee,216 the court
rejected the defendant’s argument that the agent should not have been
permitted to testify as an expert because he was simply relying on what other
agents had told him. The court concluded that the agent could rely on this
pooled information if it was the type of information reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field.217 The problem is that any group with a shared
experience base will vouch for the practice of relying on pooled
information—the lore of the group.218 When the court treats a witness as an
expert because the witness has access to this pooled information, the court
allows the witness to present the views of the group in the guise of expert
opinion. In this way, the witness transmits to the jury the beliefs of a group
of self-proclaimed and possibly biased experts who employ no reliable
method to draw inferences from their pooled information. Not only does

215. See United States v. Murphy, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (D. Kan. 2006) (rejecting the
argument that defense witness’s conversations with many marijuana growers established expertise).
By contrast, shared information can play a key role in determining whether a law enforcement
officer had probable cause. See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating
that, while pooled information is permissible testimony in probable cause challenges, it is not
admissible at trial under Rule 701); see also Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 256 (6th
Cir. 2003) (finding probable cause based on the information “gathered collectively” and shared by
the police officers at the scene); Dubner v. City of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting
that probable cause may be established “through the collective knowledge of the officers at the
scene”); United States v. Cruz, 834 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that “[t]he determination of
whether probable cause . . . exists can be based on the collective knowledge of all of the officers
involved . . . .”).
216. 339 F. App’x 153.
217. Id. at 157.
218. For example, it is quite likely that the beekeeper or the farmer, discussed supra Section
VI.A, has discussed the problem at hand (bees’ takeoffs or fertilizer) with other beekeepers or
farmers. A body of untested, but trusted, lore may have developed from this pooled information.
See Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 159, at 15, 60 (discussing the problem of a “guild-like
group . . . who share the same beliefs and general methods”).
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such an approach fail to ensure reliability, it actually heightens the threat of
unreliability while clothing the witness in the mantle of specialized
knowledge and expertise.
This problem exists in some areas of forensic science. A forensic
witness’s expertise may rest on having been apprenticed by a more
experienced expert, neither of them having grounding in a methodological
approach.219 Arson investigators, for example, have often been permitted to
testify as experts, even though their assessments rest on experience and
shared “wisdom” rather than developed and reliable methodology.220 Based

219. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 15 (discussing problems of
professional culture in the forensic sciences); see also Beecher-Monas, supra note 20, at 88–91
(demonstrating that even claims of methodology do not assure reliability and should be scrutinized);
Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, supra note 16, at 481 (discussing some forensic expert testimony as
examples of “connoisseur testimony”); Risinger et al., supra note 166, at 27–42 (discussing ways in
which results of forensic analysis are skewed by observer effects). Courts continue to accept claims
of expertise based primarily on experience and rely on the acceptance of an opinion by similarly
qualified experts to assure reliability. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 202 F. App’x 399, 401
(11th Cir. 2006) (holding testimony of arson expert qualified through experience was properly
admitted, noting in part that his “findings were subject to review by his co-workers and
supervisors”).
Handwriting analysis is also a field where analysis presented as expert analysis is not
supported by reliable methodology, but often seems to be the result of lore transmitted from one
“expert” to another. See United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1157 (6th Cir. 1997) (pre-Kumho
decision acknowledging that expert handwriting analysis is not supported by empirical evidence, but
nevertheless concluding it is admissible); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a
Proxy For Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 731 (1989); see also United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing
handwriting expertise in case where expert summarized her analytical approach, but did not establish
its reliability; concluding that trial court should have admitted testimony of critic of handwriting
expertise). The National Research Council of the National Academies summarized its findings on
handwriting analysis as follows:
The scientific basis for handwriting comparisons needs to be strengthened. Recent
studies have increased our understanding of the individuality and consistency of
handwriting and computer studies and suggest that there may be a scientific basis for
handwriting comparison, at least in the absence of intentional obfuscation or forgery.
Although there has been only limited research to quantify the reliability and replicability
of the practices used by trained document examiners, the committee agrees that there may
be some value in handwriting analysis.
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 166–67 (footnotes omitted). Some
handwriting witnesses also testify as experienced lay witnesses and are therefore subject to the
limitations of the lay opinion rule. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, § 11, at 54 (cites recognition
of skilled lay observer on handwriting recognition).
220. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES § 7-1.1, at 339
(2002) (describing the process of using accepted tools and clues to determine the cause of a fire:
“Some of these clues are derived from sound science. Others are nothing more than a set of more or
less shared beliefs that may or may not be true. An opinion is then reached by these clues being
processed through each investigator’s personal experience, beliefs and assumptions—in addition to
or instead of any well tested model for analyzing fire evidence.” (footnotes omitted)). The
experience would include the observation of similar patterns at fires that the witness believed
resulted from arson and dissimilar patterns at fires that the witness did not believe resulted from
arson. Explorations of whether arson expertise rests on reliable methodology have now revealed the
speculative and unreliable nature of much expert testimony. See id. § 7-1.2, at 343 (reporting that
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on experience and pooled information, the witness would testify that certain
physical evidence (burn patterns or reactions of window glass) were signs of
arson, indicating that the fire was set and signaling where it originated.221
The problems associated with pooled information infect arson testimony: An
arson “expert” would erroneously conclude that a fire resulted from arson
when it had not, and would then share the observations from the fire scene
with other arson investigators to support the belief that certain patterns
indicated arson—beliefs later shown to be wrong.222 The courts that allowed
these arson investigators to testify as experts should have rejected claims of
expertise based on shared information, and instead evaluated and excluded
the offered testimony as lay opinion.223
The use of pooled information that has not been tested by reliable
methodology is likely to compound the effect of inaccurate inferential
reasoning. When experience-based opinions and beliefs do not pass through
the crucible of a methodology that checks for accuracy and reliability, the
effect of perception bias or other distorting reasoning is reinforced. The
before Kumho was decided, “some insurance company attorneys began counseling fire investigators
to identify themselves as ‘experience-based’ experts, in an effort to avoid scrutiny under Daubert”);
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 173 (discussing unreliability of arson
expertise); Grann, supra note 182, at 42 (discussing unreliability of arson evidence).
221. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 220, § 7-1.1, at 341 (citing concrete spalling, crazed glass, and
burn pattern testimony as having been common and having been unsupported by empirical research).
Courts continue to accept claims of arson expertise based primarily on experience. See, e.g.,
Santiago, 202 F. App’x 399. In Santiago, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that an expert’s testimony
that the fire resulted from arson was properly admitted even though the witness was not a certified
arson investigator given his experience in the field. Id. at 401.
222. The National Academy of Sciences Report states:
Despite the paucity of research, some arson investigators continue to make
determinations about whether or not a particular fire was set. However, according to
testimony presented to the committee, many of the rules of thumb that are typically
assumed to indicate that an accelerant was used (e.g., “alligatoring” of wood, specific
char patterns) have been shown not to be true.
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 173.
223. Had the courts evaluated the opinion as lay opinion, the courts should have excluded the
evidence, determining that the witness could not reach the offered opinions by applying lay
reasoning to the witness’s experience base. The witness could not know with certainty which of the
earlier observed fire sites resulted from arson and which did not. That missing knowledge injects a
risk that the witness would engage in questionable reasoning and arrive at unfounded conclusions. A
witness reasoning from experience uninformed by reliable methodology might conclude that,
because a particular fire pattern is present at the site of the questioned fire and was also present at the
site of an earlier fire, which the witness believed resulted from arson, the questioned fire must also
have resulted from arson. If the presence of the pattern also influenced the witness to conclude that
the first fire resulted from arson, the reasoning is circular and the basis for concluding the first fire
was arson is flawed. However, even if the witness knew with certainty that the earlier fire or fires
resulted from arson, lay reasoning does not support the conclusion that a particular burn pattern at
the earlier site suggests arson.
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entire lore may be skewed by faulty reasoning and by the resulting
expectations of those making the observations.224 As a result, those relying
on the pooled information will become biased observers.225 The courts
should recognize that a witness does not become an expert through the
transfer of unconfirmed lore and may be more likely than a witness without
that preconditioning to jump to unfounded conclusions.
C. Evaluate the Fit Between the Witness’s Experience and the Opinion
Once expertise is established, an expert witness is allowed to call on
undisclosed pools of information gleaned from others in the field, as well as
the expert’s own personal observations.226 The expert is not required to
provide all the background information. A lay witness should not be
accorded similar latitude. Instead, the court must consider whether the
combination of the witness’s experience and observation of relevant facts in
the case allows the witness to derive the proffered opinion through the
application of everyday reasoning.227 In some cases, the witness’s
experience base supports the lay opinion.228 In others, however, the opinion

224. For example, a novice beekeeper will be told that bees take off only into the wind. That will
encourage the beekeeper to look for that phenomenon and discount anything the beekeeper observes
to the contrary.
225. In United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), the Supreme Court explained bias as follows:
Bias is a term used in the “common law of evidence” to describe the relationship between
a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise,
his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness’s like,
dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’s self-interest. Proof of bias is almost always
relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically
been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a
witness’s testimony.
Id. at 52.
226. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
227. See, e.g., United States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that
officer’s testimony concerning certain aspects of narcotics trafficking was admissible lay opinion
where the officer laid out his experience in some detail; the testimony stayed within the realm of
inferences rationally based on the officer’s knowledge); United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566,
1577 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that officer was allowed to express lay opinion that burn marks on
victim’s back “were consistent with marks that would be left by a stun gun,” an opinion rationally
derived from his prior observations); see also FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 220, § 7-1.3.3, at 348
(suggesting that “[c]ourts would be well advised to unpack the claimed ‘experience’ in order to
discover what was learned from it and whether that something supports a valid and reliable expert
opinion”).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 602–04 (7th Cir. 2007) (witness provided
opinion based on his own observations that cocaine is packaged by cutting the end off a baggie and
then twisting or tying the drug into the removed corner of the bag; the opinion should have been
allowed as admissible lay opinion).
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cannot be rationally derived by bringing the witness’s experience to bear on
the observed facts.229
In Satcher v. Honda Motor Co.,230 discussed above, the court allowed a
former police officer to testify to an expert opinion concerning the efficacy
of crash bars on police motorcycles.231 The witness drew on his experience
serving on the police motor squad and his investigation of hundreds of
motorcycle accidents.232 His opinion was based on his application of
everyday reasoning to draw inferences from the other motorcycle
accidents—other happenings—he had observed. The court should have
evaluated his testimony as lay opinion and should also have determined the
similarity or dissimilarity of the circumstances in those other accidents.
Without that inquiry, the court had no assurance that the opinion was
rationally based on the witness’s experience and the observed facts.
In United States v. Maher,233 the court allowed the prosecution to
present lay opinion from a law enforcement officer that, based on his
training and experience, the Post-It note found in the defendant’s van was a
“drug note[],” or a “[d]rug distributor’s way of being organized.”234 The
court should have been more exacting. First, the opinion was not supported
by any demonstration that the officer had sufficient experience with similar
uses of Post-It notes to support his opinion.235 Without that information, the

229. See, e.g., id. In Oriedo, the Seventh Circuit approved the trial court’s decision to admit as
lay opinion the testimony of an agent who testified that he was “personally concerned about there
being two vehicles” because “more than one vehicle . . . raises concerns about” counter-surveillance.
Id. at 602. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the witness’s testimony involved only lay opinion
because the agent did not testify about counter-surveillance practices in the drug trade or
characterize what he saw as counter-surveillance. Id. In Oriedo, the opinion should not have been
admitted without a demonstration that the agent had an adequate basis in personal observation to
support the opinion. The court noted that the agent only testified to “his own state of mind while
observing this particular drug deal.” Id. Of course, the greatest problem with this testimony is that
the agent’s state of mind was entirely irrelevant in the jury trial, but the court did not address that
concern. This may represent an example of a court not differentiating between evidence relevant to
a Fourth Amendment question, but not relevant to the question of guilt or innocence. The agent’s
state of mind could contribute to probable cause, but was not relevant at the defendant’s trial.
230. 52 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1995).
231. Id. at 1316–18.
232. Id. at 1317–18.
233. 454 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006).
234. Id. at 24.
235. To be admitted as lay opinion, the officer’s opinion must be extrapolated from similar events
in his experience base, but the prosecution did not elicit testimony establishing that similar events
existed. The opinion testimony constituted a shortcut for evidence of similar events—instances in
which such notes had been found and had been shown to be drug records—and the connection of
those events to the defendant’s case through the officer’s opinion. If this aspect of the prosecution’s
case were unpacked, the trial court would have to go through a much more careful analysis. First,
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court could not ensure compliance with the requirement that the opinion be
rationally based on the witness’s perception.236 Furthermore, the manner in
which it was presented gave the jurors no basis for independent assessment
and invited them merely to defer to the superior knowledge of the officer.
D. Limit Opinion Based on Third Party Conduct
The use of third party conduct to form the opinion that a defendant acted
in a way that was typical of particular criminal activity is a recurrent
problem in the testimony of law enforcement witnesses.237 Experiencebased law enforcement opinion witnesses often testify to inferences based on
third party conduct. The prosecution uses these opinion witnesses to paint
the defendant with the criminality of others they have investigated. The
witness accomplishes this goal either by testifying that the defendant’s
apparently innocent conduct is actually criminal behavior because the
witness has seen other criminals behave in the same way or that the
defendant’s criminal behavior has particular significance not otherwise
apparent to the jury. In this manner, law enforcement witnesses have
labeled using Post-It notes,238 riding a bicycle around the neighborhood,239
and driving a rental car as conduct that signals involvement in drug

the prosecution would present evidence of the similar events—instances observed by this particular
officer (not recounted to him by others) and sufficiently similar to be probative; the court would
have to determine that these other instances cleared the hurdle of basic relevance under Rule 402 and
also had sufficient probative value to avoid exclusion under Rule 403 as being unfairly prejudicial.
Second, the court would have to determine that the officer’s opinion reflected a rational inference
from this pool of data and was helpful to the jury, even though the jury was now armed with as much
information as the officer. The claim that the officer participated in numerous drug cases should not
be allowed to substitute for more specific information about the officer’s particular basis of
knowledge concerning the use of drug notes.
236. See also United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In Williams, without
examining the basis for the officer’s opinion, the trial court permitted a patrol officer to testify as an
expert that drug users commonly carry guns for protection. Id. at 1306. When the court of appeals
examined the basis for the opinion, the court concluded that the witness had been involved in fewer
than twelve arrests involving firearm possession, not enough to support his opinion testimony. Id. at
1309. The court also concluded that the foundation was insufficient to support a lay opinion on the
issue. Id. at 1309–10. But see United States v. Gill, 513 F.3d 836, 847 (8th Cir. 2008) (dismissing
defendant’s argument that agent should not be permitted to testify about the connection between
firearms and drug trafficking because he had no experience with drugs and licensed firearms).
237. See generally Peter Schofield, Comment, Criteria for Admissibility of Expert Opinion
Testimony on Criminal Modus Operandi, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 547 (discussing the use of testimony
concerning typical modus operandi to convince the jury that defendant’s conduct was criminal).
238. See, e.g., United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 2006); see also United States v.
Throckmorton, 269 F. App’x 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing admissibility of officer’s testimony
about narcotics “owe-sheets”).
239. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 744–45 (6th Cir. 2006) (allowing
prosecution’s fact witnesses to testify as expert witnesses and opine that the defendant was
conducting counter-surveillance when he left home on his bicycle, and that scraps of paper contained
notes related to drug transactions).
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dealing.240 To invite the jury to connect weapon possession with drugdealing, officers have testified that drug dealers commonly carry guns for
protection.241 The courts must ensure that these opinions do not reflect
unwarranted inferences of criminality drawn by biased witnesses.
The courts should also guard against the prejudicial impact of having a
witness attach criminal significance to the defendant’s otherwise innocent
conduct by characterizing it as a modus operandi typical of a particular type
of crime. Consider, for instance, the law enforcement expert’s testimony
that a defendant’s use of a rental car signaled that defendant was an
experienced narcotics trafficker.242 The opinion rests on the inference that,
because some other drug traffickers act this way, the defendant’s action
marks him as a drug trafficker as well. The court should not give this
evidence a role in the defendant’s case. Generally, it is not permissible to
invite the jury to draw an inference about this defendant based on the
conduct of an unrelated third party. If the prosecution simply offered
evidence that a different defendant in a different case used a rented car, it
would be inadmissible because it lacks probative value and injects too much
risk of unfair prejudice.243 If the court admits this lay opinion, the court
accepts the agent-witness’s conclusion that it has happened often enough to
be a drug trafficking practice. But neither the court nor the agent is in a
position to draw that inference. The agent’s opinion is suspect because the
agent’s sample of observation is skewed to include a disproportionate
number of drug transactions, leaving the agent unable to assess the use of

240. United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 1997); see also United
States v. Millbrook, 553 F.3d 1057, 1064–65 (7th Cir. 2009) (allowing agent to testify as an expert
that drug users pay in small bills, in order to explain defendant’s possession of $1000 in cash and
refute his claim that he was going to use it to pay an $800 utility bill), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Jeanetta, 533 F.3d 651 (8th
Cir. 2008) (allowing expert law enforcement witness to testify that Ziploc bags, radios, scanners,
cameras, monitors, night vision goggles and large quantities of cash were all associated with drug
dealing); United States v. Martinez-Avina, 234 F. App’x 688, 690 (9th Cir. 2007) (agent testified
that having air freshener and only one or two keys in a vehicle signaled that it was transporting
drugs).
241. See United States v. Farrish, 297 F. App’x 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2008) (listing the government’s
evidence that drug dealers commonly carry guns as support for defendant’s conviction); United
States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 582, 589 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that “drug dealers frequently carry
weapons”); see also Williams, 212 F.3d at 1309–10 (holding patrol officer did not have enough
experience to testify to the opinion that drug users commonly carry guns for protection).
242. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d at 1243–44; see also Capra, Distinguishing Between Lay
Witnesses, supra note 3, at 3, 34 (discussing Figueroa-Lopez).
243. See supra Section IV.A.3.
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rental cars in the general population. Moreover, the agent is a biased
observer, watching for signs of narcotics trafficking.244
The government’s use of the drug courier profile also illustrates the risk
of such testimony. When admitted as proof of guilt, the witness testifying to
the drug courier profile is allowed to list the aspects of the defendant’s
behavior that typify drug courier behavior.245 The witness is permitted to
opine, and the jury is invited to infer, that the defendant is guilty because the
defendant shares these behaviors with others who have committed drug
offenses.246 Courts have recognized that such testimony injects a substantial
risk of unfair prejudice and is generally improper.247 The courts should
extend that cautious approach to other similar uses of third party conduct.

244. The opinion should also be excluded as expert opinion. Nothing assures the reliability of the
conclusion. The agent does not employ a reliable methodology to ensure that she does not ascribe
unwarranted significance to innocent behavior and act as a biased witness who may not reliably
decide the fair probative value of the instances of similar conduct in other criminal transactions.
Although the Advisory Committee acknowledged these types of law enforcement experts when Rule
702 was amended to reflect Daubert’s emphasis on reliability, the Committee did not explain how
the process employed by the agent differs from lay reasoning applied to a deep experience base and
satisfies the requirement of reliable methodology:
For example, when a law enforcement agent testifies regarding the use of code words in a
drug transaction, the principle used by the agent is that participants in such transactions
regularly use code words to conceal the nature of their activities. The method used by the
agent is the application of extensive experience to analyze the meaning of the
conversations. So long as the principles and methods are reliable and applied reliably to
the facts of the case, this type of testimony should be admitted.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
245. See, e.g., United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991). In Lui, the trial court permitted
an agent to testify that the defendant showed five characteristics of a drug courier:
(1) [A]lthough “heroin couriers have a hundred ways to smuggle heroin,” typically they
wrap it around their bodies or place it in false bottoms and tops of suitcases; (2) in
approximately 80 percent of smuggling cases, couriers use hard-sided suitcases; (3)
couriers often use the excuse of conducting business or visiting a relative in the United
States; (4) couriers create itineraries with multiple stops for short periods of time so as to
enter the United States from a “non-source” country to avoid detection; and (5) couriers
often use paging devices.
Id. at 846.
246. It has been noted that the profile can be adapted to fit almost any traveler. See, e.g., United
States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 719 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the court has long been critical of
drug courier profiles); United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012, 1014 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that “[d]rug courier profiles are
inherently prejudicial because of the potential they have for including innocent citizens as profiled
drug couriers”). The profile is more appropriately used as a test for reasonable suspicion to justify a
search or seizure than as an indicator of guilt at trial. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690
(1996) (drug courier profile information went towards forming reasonable suspicion); United States
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (allowing drug courier information to form reasonable suspicion for
investigative stop); United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977). But see United States v.
Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (cautioning against using profile generalizations to
establish reasonable suspicion).
247. See United States v. Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d 657, 662–63 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that
admission of agent’s testimony concerning modus operandi of drug dealers was error); United States
v. Jones, 913 F.2d 174, 176–77 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding it was error to permit an agent to testify
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The courts should not defer to government claims that a witness,
whether expert or lay, is drawing fair inferences from the conduct of others.
Instead, the court should scrutinize the opinion. The court should not permit
the inference unless the party offering the opinion provides information
concerning base rates—how frequently or infrequently the same conduct
occurs in innocent contexts.248 For example, the fact that packages of drugs
are frequently wrapped in duct tape may be helpful when trying to determine
the contents of a package wrapped in duct tape, but it does not support the
inference that possession of duct tape signals drug dealing. The base rate
undermines the inference: many who do not distribute drugs possess duct
tape. Without base rate information, the court should recognize the risk that
the opinion witness is presenting an unfounded inference, skewed by the
observer’s bias, and only rarely admit opinion testimony based on third party
conduct.
E. Prohibit Over-Claiming
The courts should prohibit experience-based witnesses from drawing
broad conclusions from the observed facts.249 The cases illustrate efforts to
push opinion testimony past any reasonable limit.250

“that crack dealers often sell crack in small quantities and keep the proceeds from the sales nearby
rather than in a bank” and “that crack dealers normally possess firearms and that crack users can be
distinguished from dealers by the amount of the drug that each keeps on hand”); United States v.
Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding profile evidence should not have been
admitted). The courts permit the use of drug courier profile testimony at trial to provide background
explaining why the defendant was stopped or arrested or to rebut certain defense claims. See United
States v. Sanchez-Hernandez, 507 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 2007) (allowing agent’s testimony because it
was not precisely profile testimony and it served to rebut defendant’s claims of innocence); United
States v. Urbina, 431 F.3d 305, 311–12 (8th Cir. 2005) (allowing profile evidence to rebut
defendant’s claim that he was unaware of drugs in gas tank); United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d
1208, 1212–13 (9th Cir. 1989) (allowing profile evidence to rebut defendant’s claim he was too poor
to be a courier).
248. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 112.
249. See, e.g., United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 602 (7th Cir. 2007) (approving admission of
agent’s testimony that he was “personally concerned about there being two vehicles” because “more
than one vehicle . . . raises concerns about . . . countersurveillance”); United States v. Grinage, 390
F.3d 746, 747–50 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that trial court improperly permitted agent to provide
opinions based on his investigation and the content of 2000 recorded phone conversations describing
the criminal organization and the roles of various participants).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2011) (condemning use of an agent to
give broad overview of criminal case); Jinro Am. Inc. v. Secure Invs., Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 1001–06
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that trial court properly excluded testimony about the tendency of Korean
businessmen to circumvent currency regulations and the ways in which they did so); Trevino v.
Rock Island Police Dept., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1206–08 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (reporting that plaintiff
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When agents are accepted as experts, they are sometimes permitted to
state quite broad opinions concerning the criminal character of a defendant’s
conduct.251 In United States v. Brown,252 for example, the courts allowed
law enforcement experts to opine that a particular apartment was used for
storing drugs, that the defendant’s stop at the house was “consistent with . . .
a drug delivery,” that the defendant had control over the apartment, and that
the defendant’s actions “were consistent with that of someone engaging in
counter-surveillance activities and attempting to destroy evidence.”253 In
this way, the prosecution used its expert witnesses to endorse the inferences
the prosecution hoped to persuade the jury to draw.254 These inferences
should be the subject of argument rather than testimony.255
Even when a witness testifies to lay opinion, the party offering the
testimony may push the witness to over-claim. In United States v. Garcia,
for example, the prosecution presented the case agent at trial as a lay witness
to introduce the case by describing the roles played in the drug conspiracy
by the various defendants, and the trial court allowed the testimony.256 This

wanted to use monocular police officer to testify to broad assertions about the performance of
monocular officers based only on his own experience).
251. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 197 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that
prosecution expert strayed from his expertise when he stated opinion concerning what defendant
meant by particular statement); United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 59 (2d Cir. 2003)
(concluding that trial court had improperly permitted expert to provide opinion testimony outside the
scope of his expertise).
252. 110 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 1997).
253. Id. at 610.
254. See also United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 744–45 (6th Cir. 2006). In LopezMedina, the prosecution’s fact witnesses also served as expert witnesses and stated opinions
concerning the criminal character of defendant’s conduct. Id. at 743. The Sixth Circuit concluded
that the trial court did not sufficiently inform the jury on the demarcation between the expert opinion
and the fact testimony, but did not condemn the opinion testimony. Id. at 745. The prosecution sees
such value in this testimony that it sometimes offers expert testimony on criminal behavior when it is
not relevant to the particular case. See, e.g., United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1015–16 (9th
Cir. 2001) (concluding that agent’s testimony on drug trafficking was not relevant to the case against
the defendant and noting that the government reported that it routinely introduces such testimony in
all drug cases).
255. See United States v. Moore, 521 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2008) (prosecution expert testified
that no one who was not involved with the drug deal would be present at the deal); United States v.
Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 758–60 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that agent properly testified to expert opinion
that defendant’s otherwise innocent behavior looking up and down the street constituted countersurveillance).
256. 413 F.3d 201, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2005) (recounting agent’s testimony). On appeal, the
government argued unsuccessfully that “a case agent may offer, at the beginning of a trial, a lay
opinion providing a summary overview of anticipated evidence.” Id. at 211. The Second Circuit
condemned this practice, but concluded it was harmless error and upheld the conviction. The court
stated: “Klemick’s opinion did more than provide a ‘summary’ of Garcia’s words and actions—by
whomever they were observed. It told the jury that Klemick, an experienced DEA agent, had
determined, based on the total investigation of the charged crimes, that Garcia was a culpable
member of the conspiracy.” Id. at 213. The court further noted:
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testimony should have been disallowed; the agent’s biased conclusions about
the defendants’ criminality went beyond helpful lay opinion and injected
substantial prejudice into the case.
When a witness states an experience-based opinion, even if the court
admits it as lay opinion, the proponent may present the witness and the
opinion in a way that suggests expertise. For example, when a law
enforcement witness provides a lay opinion, the prosecution may emphasize
that the opinion is based on experience and training, as well as participation
in other narcotics cases, thus clothing the opinion in the appearance of
expertise.257 The trial court should prohibit such bolstering while the
witness is testifying, as well as during closing argument.
VII. CONCLUSION
The classification of experience-based testimony as either lay or expert
is critical to its admissibility. However, the line demarking the categories is
difficult to determine, and courts do not always strike the proper balance.
Too often, witnesses with unusual or rich experience bases are permitted to
testify as experts despite employing no reliable methodology or analysis.
Absent such methodology, witnesses offering experience-based testimony
merely apply ordinary lay reasoning to their experience base. Such
everyday reasoning does not meet the reliability standard required of expert
testimony. Experience alone often fails to sharpen a witness’s reasoning
process and may sometimes deepen the witness’s bias. Thus, only witnesses

[T]his practice is particularly problematic in criminal cases because it allows “the
government to paint a picture of guilt before the [supporting] evidence has been
introduced.” We . . . condemn the practice of having a case agent offer a summary
opinion as to culpability before any evidence to support such a conclusion has been
presented for jury review.
Id. at 214; see Bigelow, supra note 3, at 5–8 (discussing prosecution use of summary witnesses).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 602 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing as lay opinion
agent’s testimony, conveying a veiled claim of expertise, that based on his experience and training,
he could tell when there was counter-surveillance and that he observed counter-surveillance in the
defendant’s case); United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 24 (1st Cir. 2006) (opinion witness provided
no specific basis in past experience for reaching conclusion that Post-It notes were a “[d]rug
distributors’ way of being organized,” but alluded to his experience and training, thus suggesting that
the opinion rested on expert knowledge). In Maher, the agents’ search had yielded a large roll of
currency and approximately half a gram of heroin in the defendant’s pocket, and, in the van, a bag
which contained three sandwich bags of cocaine, a scale, and a Post-It note listing several names,
each with a number to the right. Maher, 454 F.3d at 17. Given this evidence, it is hard to
understand why the prosecution felt the need to elicit the officer’s opinion concerning the nature of
the Post-it note.
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who use reliable methodology to form their opinions should be permitted to
testify as experts.
Witnesses who derive their opinions by applying everyday reasoning to
their personal experiences should be treated as lay witnesses. Rule 701
provides the appropriate framework for scrutinizing experience-based
opinion testimony. The rule directs the court to ensure that the opinion is
rationally derived from facts perceived by the witness. The court should
assess the reasonableness of the witness’s inferences given the witness’s
experience and the facts known to the witness. Thus, the classification of
experience-based testimony as lay testimony will keep courts from
attributing inappropriate value and deference to such testimony.
Further, courts should apply Rule 701 with bite. Rather than accepting
at face value a witness’s claims based on training or shared experiences,
courts should recognize that groups sometimes subscribe to a set of shared,
but nonetheless unreliable, beliefs. Courts should also scrutinize whether
the witness’s experience base is sufficiently extensive to support the opinion,
limit the extent to which opinion testimony may be based on the conduct of
unrelated third parties, and insist that the witness refrain from over-claiming
by suggesting that a lay opinion rests on expertise or by drawing over-broad
inferences from the witness’s experience. By giving teeth to the lay opinion
rule, courts can avoid admitting opinion testimony that lacks a sufficient
basis and ensure that only reliable inferences fairly drawn from experience
are presented to the jury.
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